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Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.: Pulling a Tarp of Antitrust
Immunity over the Entire Playing Field and Leaving the Game
Throughout this century, courts have struggled in their attempt
to harmonize the often-conflicting policies of labor relations and anti-
trust protection While labor policy favors the formation of
collective bargaining agreements between labor and management,2
with disputes between the two parties being resolved by the National
Labor Relations Board (the "NLRB") rather than the courts,3 those
agreements often contain terms that restrain trade in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The primary difficulty faced by the courts
has been determining whether and when to intervene in labor rela-
tions and apply antitrust law to situations which labor laws allow or
even encourage.
In a recent class action brought by professional football players,
the Supreme Court once again addressed the conflict between labor
policy and antitrust law. After the expiration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement in 1987, the National Football League (the "NFL"
or the "League") and the National Football League Players Associa-
tion ("the players" or "the Players Association") were unable to
reach a new agreement In 1989, still operating without an agree-
ment, the League proposed a plan that would allow each team to
carry a "developmental squad" of six players on its roster, with each
player on the squad to be paid a fixed salary.6 When the players re-
1. See infra notes 82-239 and accompanying text; see also Douglas L. Leslie, Princi-
ples of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1980) ("Accommodating antitrust
policy and labor policy is not an easy task. The conflict between the two is fundamental:
the antitrust statutes promote competition and economic efficiency, while the federal
labor statutes sanction activity that is arguably anticompetitive."); Bernard D. Meltzer,
Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 678
(1965) (referring to the "uncertainties that fundamentally arise from the absence of a
principle for harmonizing the conflict between the policy of commercial competition and
of collective bargaining").
2. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157-58 (1994).
3. See id. §§ 153, 156; Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404,
413 (1982); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449,353 U.S. 87,96 (1957).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.").
5. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 129 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
6. See id. at 127.
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fused to agree to this plan, the League determined that a bargaining
impasse had been reached and unilaterally implemented the proposal
over the objections of the players.7 In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,8
the Supreme Court held that the League's actions were shielded from
antitrust liability by the judicially created "nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion" to the antitrust laws.9
This Note discusses the facts of Brown, its history in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issues presented by
the case. 0 The Note then examines the history of the interplay be-
tween labor and antitrust law, the courts' confusion concerning their
role in the interplay, and the evolution of the judicial "nonstatutory
labor exemption" to antitrust law.11 It also addresses how the courts
have dealt with the scope of the exemption in recent years, particu-
larly regarding the duration of the exemption and the range of
exempt actions. Finally, the Note discusses the possible ramifica-
tions of the Court's decision, its relation to precedent, and the
possible motivation behind the Court's repositioning in regard to la-
bor issues.
The NFL was in its second year without a collective bargaining
agreement when the team owners voted to adopt Resolution G-2 in
the spring of 1989.14 The resolution, developed by the League's plan-
7. See id. at 128.
8. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
9. See id. at 2121. Although the principle had been applied in earlier cases, the
Court first expressly recognized the "nonstatutory labor exemption" from the antitrust
laws in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616 (1975). The Connell Court noted that unions enjoyed a statutory exemption
from antitrust liability because labor statutes declared that unions are not "combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade," and exempted certain union activity from antitrust
liability. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104-05
(1994)). However, nothing in the statutes specifically exempted concerted action be-
tween unions and management, which meant that the collective bargaining agreements
between the two were not statutorily protected from antitrust liability. See id. at 622. In
order to remedy this situation, the Court stated that "a proper accommodation between
the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the [National Labor Rela-
tions Act] and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets
requires that some union-employer agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemp-
tion from antitrust sanctions." Id. (emphasis added).
10. See infra notes 14-81 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 82-194 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 195-239 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 240-368 and accompanying text.
14. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119. Due to the history of labor disputes in the NFL,
"long and difficult negotiations over a new collective bargaining agreement" were ex-
pected. Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989
DuKE L.J. 339, 339. In an unsuccessful attempt to prompt a new agreement, the players
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ning committee,' grew out of the concern that certain team owners
were attempting to evade roster limits by "stashing" players on the
injured reserve list.16 The League's solution was to allow each team
to have a developmental squad of six first-year players who would
practice with the team and occasionally substitute for injured play-
ers.17 The players would be paid a fixed, League-mandated salary of
$1,000 per week and individual negotiations with such players were
"not permitted.'.
There had been no similar arrangement in the recently expired
1982-1987 agreement, which had expressly given each player the right
to individually negotiate his own salary. 9 The players adamantly re-
fused to relinquish this right and made clear that they would not
submit to an agreement permitting the League to set the salaries of
certain players." In June of 1989, the League concluded that a bar-
gaining impasse had been reached in regard to the proposal,' and it
unilaterally implemented Resolution G-2 when the season began that
September." A number of players from the developmental squads
brought an antitrust class action suit against the League in the spring
of 1990.2
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
players on the issue of whether the NFL's actions were shielded from
antitrust liability by the "nonstatutory labor exemption." 24 The court
conducted a strike for 24 days at the beginning of the 1987 season. See id. at 340 & n.8.
15. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
16. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
17. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119.
18. Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 128.
19. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted
that the League's decision to fix the salaries of the developmental squad players was a
particularly significant departure from prior practice because the individual negotiation of
players' salaries had "prevailed even prior to collective bargaining." Id. at 2130 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
20. See Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 128. Eugene Upshaw, the representative of the play-
ers union, sent a letter to the League stating the union's stance that " 'all players,
including developmental, should have the right to negotiate salary terms, and that no
fixed wage for any group of players is acceptable to the [players union].'" Id.
21. See id. The "bargaining" over the proposal consisted of one meeting and several
letters and phone calls over the course of several months. See id. at 127-28.
22. See id. at 128. In September, Pete Rozelle, the Commissioner of the NFL, sent a
memorandum to each NFL team, reiterating the salary terms of developmental squad
players and warning against individual negotiations with the players or the provision of
compensatory perquisites. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 131; see also supra note 9 (discussing the nonstatutory exemption).
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explained that the nonstatutory exemption was created to protect
labor-management agreements from antitrust liability.? The exemp-
tion no longer applies when an agreement expires "because the
reason for the exemption no longer exists: the union no longer
agrees to the restraint and therefore continuation of the restraint
violates the Sherman Act."'  The jury trial that followed resulted in a
treble-damage award of over $30,000,000 against the NFL.27
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reversed? The court stated that the case called for a
determination of "whether the nation's labor laws or antitrust policy
control[led],, 29 and concluded that the dictates of labor policy took
precedence over the considerations of antitrust law? Because the
25. See Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 132. The district court quoted language from Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22
(1975), stating that labor policy requires that" 'some union-employer agreements be ac-
corded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust liability.' " Brown, 782 F. Supp.
at 130 (alteration in original).
26. Brown, 782 F. Supp. at 132. The court alternatively held that if the exemption did
not expire with the agreement, then it expired at impasse. See id. at 134. Noting that
some authority favored extending the exemption beyond expiration of the agreement, the
district court conceded that it understood the policy promoted by such an approach-
namely, the provision of a non-coercive atmosphere in which the parties could try to
reach a new agreement without the employer fearing antitrust liability. See id at 135.
The district court explained, however, that when negotiations toward a new agreement
stalled at impasse, extension of the exemption beyond that point simply allowed the em-
ployer to force unagreed-upon terms on the union; thus, new agreements would be less
likely to be reached because the employer would favor bargaining to impasse. See i&t at
135-36.
Yet another alternative holding was that the nonstatutory exemption did not apply at
all because the NFL had implemented terms that had not been in the expired collective
bargaining agreement. See id- at 137. Again, the district court embraced the idea that the
exemption pertained to certain agreements, see id at 138, and reasoned that there was no
basis for extending it to cover the imposition of terms to which one party had never
agreed. See id. at 138-39.
27. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119.
28. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S.
Ct. 2116 (1996).
29. Id. at 1045.
30. See id. at 1056. The court of appeals noted that the National Labor Relations
Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994), had not been interpreted as forbidding employers
from making unilateral changes after impasse, provided those changes were proposed in
pre-impasse bargaining. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1051. The court also noted that labor
policy provides both unions and employers with economic weapons, and that allowing the
unions the ability to bring antitrust claims would give them a "powerful new weapon" that
would distort the carefully created balance. Id at 1052. Furthermore, the court stated
that antitrust law should be applied primarily to restraints in a product market, not a la-
bor market. See id. at 1054. The court therefore concluded that "when federal labor
policy collides with federal antitrust policy in a labor market organized around a collec-
tive bargaining relationship, antitrust policy must give way." Id. at 1056.
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labor laws allowed the unilateral imposition of terms after impasse3'
and the NFL's actions "primarily affect[ed] only a labor market or-
ganized around a collective bargaining relationship,"3 2 the court held
that the nonstatutory exemption should extend beyond expiration of
the agreement and beyond impasse in order to protect the "entire
collective bargaining process." 33
The Supreme Court affirmed," although it slightly narrowed the
appellate court's interpretation of the scope of the exemption. 5 Ac-
cording to the Court, four characteristics made the NFL's actions fall
within the scope of the "nonstatutory labor exemption:" (1) the ac-
tions "took place during and immediately after a collective-
bargaining negotiation"; (2) they "grew out of, and [were] directly
related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process"; (3) they
involved a mandatory subject of bargaining under the federal labor
laws; and (4) they "concerned only the parties to the collective-
bargaining relationship.,
36
Characterizing the nonstatutory exemption somewhat differently
than it had in the past, the Court described it as being applicable
"where needed to make the collective-bargaining process work."37
The Court reasoned that the exemption was necessary as a matter of
"both history and logic." 3 Historically, the Court explained, the ex-
emption reflected Congress's intent that labor laws, not the antitrust
31. See Brown, 50 F.3d at 1051.
32 Id. at 1048.
33. Id. at 1051. The appellate court concluded that "injecting antitrust liability into
the system for resolving disputes between unions and employers would both subvert na-
tional labor policy and exaggerate federal antitrust concerns." Id. at 1056.
34. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119. Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion and wasjoined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Tho-
mas, and Ginsburg. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion. See id. at 2128 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 2119. The D.C. Circuit distinguished between antitrust applicability to
product market restraints and to labor market restraints, see 50 F.3d at 1050-51; supra
note 30, and essentially held that all labor market restraints that apply to parties in a col-
lective bargaining relationship are exempt from antitrust scrutiny. See Brown, 50 F.3d at
1056. The scope of the exemption as the Supreme Court defined it, although very broad,
does not absolutely preclude application of the exemption in a labor context. See infra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
36. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
37. Id. at 2119. When the Court first expressly recognized the nonstatutory exemp-
tion, it described it as applying to "some union-employer agreements." Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975); see also
supra note 9 (discussing the nonstatutory exemption).
38. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120.
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statutes, be used to resolve labor disputes.39 Logically, it would be
inconsistent to legislatively require labor and management to bargain
together and then hold their agreements-which often restrain trade
in some way-illegal under the antitrust laws.40
The Court reasoned that in order to protect the collective bar-
gaining process, the scope of the exemption must be broad and the
exemption must apply to employers as well as employees.41 Having
established this, the Court reached the issue of whether the scope was
broad enough to cover a multi-employer bargaining unit's unilateral
imposition of terms after a bargaining impasse.42 The Court con-
cluded that the scope was sufficiently broad to cover such actions.43 It
recognized that labor law (acting apart from antitrust law) allows
employers to unilaterally implement new or changed terms after a
bargaining impasse is reached, provided that those terms were
"reasonably comprehended" in the employer's previous proposals'
and the employer does not bargain in bad faith.45 The Court noted
that this "reflect[s] the fact that impasse and an accompanying im-
plementation of proposals constitute an integral part of the bargaining
process," and thus should be shielded from antitrust liability by the
nonstatutory exemption.46
As additional support for its conclusion, the Court reasoned that
a multi-employer bargaining group would be put in an extremely dif-
ficult position if it were potentially subject to antitrust liability after
bargaining reached impasse.47 If every employer in a multi-employer
group were to impose the same new terms after impasse, they could
39. See id. The Court noted that Congress's enactment of labor statutes in 1914 and
in the 1930s was designed to keep courts and antitrust law out of "labor disputes." Id.
Those statutes, however, focused primarily on preventing employers from using the anti-
trust laws against the unions. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 102, 104, 113
(1994).
40. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120. The national labor laws impose an obligation on
employers and employees to bargain collectively regarding "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); accord NLRB v. Wooster Div.
of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,349 (1958).
41. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
42. See iL
43. See id.
44. See id. (citing Storer Communications, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1090 (1989); Taft
Broad. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475,478 (1967), enforced, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
45. See id. (citing Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 998, 1002 (1976)).
46. Id (emphasis added); see infra notes 307-19 and accompanying text (discussing
different views on whether impasse and the subsequent unilateral imposition of terms are
part of the "bargaining process").
47. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2122-23.
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each be liable under antitrust laws.' If any employer separated from
the group and imposed different terms, that employer would be sub-
ject to an unfair labor practice charge under the labor laws.49 Finally,
if all the employers simply maintained the status quo by continuing to
operate according to the terms of the expired agreement, and the
union thought those terms were unfavorable, the employers could
again face antitrust liability if there was evidence that they acted in
concert. "All this is to say that to permit antitrust liability [in the
context of labor negotiations] threatens to introduce instability and
uncertainty into the collective-bargaining process" because antitrust
law often forbids what collective bargaining requires."1
The Court stated that although the above problem could theo-
retically be solved by allowing "antitrust courts"52 to determine the
reasonableness of employers' actions on a case-by-case basis, such a
course was impractical. 3 It would result in "a web of detailed rules
spun by many different nonexpert antitrust judges and juries,"' '
rather than a cohesive set of rules created by the NLRB.55 The Court
stressed that the NLRB was composed of experts in the field and that
48. See id. The antitrust liability would arise from the fact that the individual em-
ployers were acting identically, and their "prior or accompanying conversations"-that is,
their collective proposal of terms during the prior bargaining process or their discussions
over which new terms to implement-would evidence a "common understanding or
agreement." Id. at 2123. Presumably, this would allow the employers to be characterized
as a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade.
49. See id Labor law deems it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights [to collectively bar-
gain]," 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994), and to "refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees," id. § 158(a)(5). In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service,
Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), the Court held that an employer had violated these
sections and committed an unfair labor practice when it withdrew from a multi-employer
bargaining group after impasse and refused to abide by the agreement that was subse-
quently reached between the union and the remaining employers in the group. See id. at
406. The Court endorsed the NLRB's position that "an impasse is not an unusual circum-
stance justifying [an employer's] withdrawal" from a multi-employer bargaining unit. hL
at 412.
50. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
51. Id.
52. The Court used this term at several points in the opinion, see, e.g., id. at 2122,
2125, presumably to emphasize the distinction between courts that are capable of apply-
ing antitrust law and the NLRB, which reviews and attempts to resolve labor disputes
within the confines of labor law.
53. See id. at 2123.
54. Id.
55. See id The NLRB was created in 1935 by the National Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1994)). The NLRB's functions include overseeing the collective bargaining process
and addressing complaints of unfair labor practices.
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Congress intended that the NLRB, rather than the courts, oversee
the collective bargaining process.56 One of the objectives of the labor
laws "was to take from antitrust courts the authority to determine ...
what is socially or economically desirable collective-bargaining pol-
icy.
''5
The Court rejected the contention that "impasse" should be the
point at which the exemption expires, reiterating that this would put
employers in the aforementioned difficult situation when impasse
occurred.5 Further, the Court noted that an "impasse" line would be
difficult to draw because" 'impasse' is often temporary" and is often
merely one stage in the bargaining process.59 Additionally, it would
require nonexpert courts to determine when impasse had actually
occurred, a task for which courts are unsuited and one which should
be left to the NLRB."
56. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123, 2125. The Court has shown varying degrees of
deference to the NLRB in the past. For example, in Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) one issue was whether a disputed term was a
"term or condition of employment." Id. at 684. Although the union in that case claimed
the issue "was peculiarly within the competence of the Board," id., the Court nevertheless
asserted that it had "experience in classifying bargaining subjects" and had jurisdiction
over the case, id. at 686.
In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), the Court
displayed more deference, supporting an NLRB finding and stating that "the dissenting
Justices would have us substitute our judgment for those of the Board with respect to the
issues that Congress intended the Board to have." Id, at 418. In dissent, Chief Justice
Burger, joined by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, argued that "[t]he Court's deferral to
the Board's conclusion that its rules advance thd national labor policy ... represents just
the kind of uncritical judicial rubber stamping we have often condemned." Id. at 423
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Rehnquist was part of the Brown ma-
jority that appeared to adopt a somewhat different stance, it is perhaps relevant that, in
Bonanno, Justice Rehnquist supported an argument to allow employers " 'self-help ...
when legitimate interests of employees and employers collide.'" Id. at 422 (Burger, C..,
dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)). For a
discussion of Truck Drivers, see infra note 150.
57. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
58. See id. at 2124; see also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the
attributes of this difficult situation).
59. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2124-25; see also infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text
(discussing "impasse" and its significance in regard to the bargaining process and the du-
ration of the nonstatutory exemption).
60. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2125. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the
exemption should be extended beyond impasse only in certain circumstances-for exam-
ple, when the employer needs time to obtain legal advice as to whether impasse has
actually occurred, or when the employer engages in a lockout, which is allowed under the
labor laws. See id. The Court noted that even such a "softened" rule would still involve
courts in the bargaining process, leaving employers in the unenviable position of having to
design their bargaining strategies based on "what they predict or fear that antitrust courts,
not labor law administrators, will eventually decide." Id.
1997] 1037
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The Court also rejected the proposal that employers' post-
impasse tactics should be exempt, but not their post-impasse tenns."
Stating that "the imposition of 'terms' [is often] a bargaining
'tactic,'" the Court noted that such a rule would require nonexpert
courts to make an "amorphous" inquiry into employers' subjective
motives.' The Court repeated its concerns about performing such a
role and suggested that the collective bargaining process was no place
to have courts and judges" 'roaming at large.' "'
Finally, the Court made clear that professional sports cases did
not merit "special" treatment under the collective bargaining sys-
tem.' Noting that "it would be odd to fashion an antitrust exemption
that gave additional advantages to professional football players," the
Court concluded that the players were indistinguishable from other
workers and thus "must abide by the same legal rules.""
Although the Court's holding extends the nonstatutory exemp-
tion beyond impasse and covers the post-impasse unilateral
imposition of terms by employers, the Court stated in dicta that it
was possible that some impositions may not be immune from anti-
trust laws." If the actions of employers were "sufficiently distant in
time and in circumstances from the collective-bargaining process,"
and applying antitrust law would not interfere with the bargaining
process, then the application of such law may be appropriate." Short
of such a situation, however, the bargaining process and labor rela-
tions presumably would be beyond the reach of "antitrust courts."
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 2126 (quoting Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676,716 (1965) (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.)).
64. See id. The players argued that regardless of how the nonstatutory exemption
applied in other collective bargaining relationships, the unique characteristics of profes-
sional sports warranted different legal rules. See id.; infra note 213. In particular,
professional athletes fare better by negotiating their salaries individually, whereas in
other labor contexts the employees benefit from being able to collectively negotiate uni-
form wage levels. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126. Compare Lock, supra note 14, at 409
(arguing that professional sports merit special treatment under the labor laws), with Mi-
chael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by
Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1971) (arguing that unions of pro-
fessional athletes should not be treated differently than other unions under the antitrust
and labor laws).
65. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126.
66. See id, at 2127.
67. Id. The Court suggested that if a collective bargaining relationship "collapsed,"
perhaps due to the decertification of a union or the disintegration of a multi-employer
bargaining unit, then perhaps antitrust law would be applicable. See id. For a discussion
of union decertification, see infra notes 284-91 and accompanying text.
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In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the broad scope of the ex-
emption as defined by the majority would frustrate national labor
policy." He noted that while antitrust law serves to ensure free com-
petition and the resulting optimal price levels, 9 it is the policy of
national labor legislation to prevent such competition among job-
seeking laborers in the interest of avoiding depressed wages." Thus,
the labor statutes exempt union activity from antitrust liability in an
effort to give laborers more bargaining power through collective ac-
tion, allowing them to negotiate for higher wage levels than they
would obtain in a "free" labor market.7' In the same vein, the judicial
nonstatutory exemption protects the agreements these unions reach
with employers from antitrust sanctions.' Justice Stevens concluded
that fashioning an exemption that allows employers to collectively
take actions that depress wages below free market levels is not sup-
ported by the policies of either labor or antitrust law.'
Justice Stevens further argued that the case had unique features
and that the majority erred in treating the case as a typical collective-
bargaining dispute.74 First, Justice Stevens noted that professional
athletes want the market to determine their individual wage levels, as
opposed to other laborers who must bargain in groups for uniform
wage levels in order to avoid the effects of the free market.75 Second,
the League's proposal of Resolution G-2 was not made in an effort to
reach a new agreement, but was instead intended to control team
owners' evasion of roster limits.76 Third, Justice Stevens argued that
there had been no legitimate bargaining over the proposal at all, but
instead the League effectively had announced the terms and subse-
quently implemented them.'
68. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. See iL (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (noting the "strong labor pol-
icy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and
working conditions").
71. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 15 U.S.C. § 17
(1994) (exempting union activity from antitrust liability); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104, 105, 113
(1994) (same).
72. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See ihL at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra notes 333-36 and accompanying text.
76. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting); infira notes 337-38 and ac-
companying text.
77. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting); infra note 339 and accom-
panying text.
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Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the majority for ignoring Court
precedent."' He noted that, in the past, the Court had considered the
application of the nonstatutory exemption only in regard to agree-
ments between employers and employees, and that even when those
agreements pertained to terms that were mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining under national labor law, they did not automatically qualify
for the exemption. 9 Further recognizing the absence of any attempt
to balance the policies of labor and antitrust law, which the Court had
undertaken in earlier cases,"° Justice Stevens concluded that "the
Court's analysis would seem to constitute both an unprecedented ex-
pansion of a heretofore limited exemption, and an unexplained
repudiation of the reasoning in a prior, non-constitutional decision
that Congress itself has not seen fit to override."'"
The conflicting policies at issue in Brown have a long history in
antitrust and labor law. The Sherman Antitrust Act' was enacted by
Congress in 1890. Aimed at the business "trusts"" that had been de-
veloping, the Act broadly proclaimed in relevant part that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." ' It was unclear at the
time of the Act's passage whether organized labor was included in
the "combinations" that were subject to antitrust liability.' The lan-
78. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens referred to the Court's
prior decision in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). For a discus-
sion of Pennington, see infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
80. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Ch. 647,26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
83. See Morris D. Forkosch, Antitrust in the United States: Some Thoughts on Histori-
cal and Recent Developments, 11 GONZ. L. REv. 892, 899 (1976) ("Big business, getting
bigger and bigger, formed into groups which were monopolies or oligopolies or else exer-
cised similar control. These 'trusts' dominated the American economic scene." (footnote
omitted)). In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the first
Supreme Court decision to find a violation of the Sherman Act by a business combination,
Justice Peckham noted that the targets of the Act included:
the Beef Trust, the Standard Oil Trust, the Steel Trust, the Barbed Fence Wire
Trust, the Sugar Trust, the Cordage Trust, the Cotton Seed Oil Trust, [and] the
Whiskey Trust .... [all of which] had acquired a power which [was] dangerous
to the whole country, and ... their existence was directly antagonistic to [the
country's] peace and prosperity.
Id. at 319.
84. Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1994)).
85. See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,325 U.S. 797,801 (1945) (noting that
after the Sherman Act's passage, "[s]harp controversy soon arose as to whether [it] ap-
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guage was broad and did not specifically establish an exemption for
labor unions. While some claimed the statute was aimed only at
large business organizations trying to gain control of a market, others
thought there was no reason that unions should be beyond the reach
of the Act "if their activities ... physically interrupted the free flow
of trade or tended to create business monopolies."
Lower federal courts subscribed to the view that unions could be
held liable under the Act," and in 1908 the Supreme Court expressed
the same view in Loewe v. Lawlor." In Loewe, the Court held that a
union's secondary boycott89 of a hat manufacturer violated the anti-
trust laws." According to the Court, the union was restraining trade,
and the Sherman Act clearly stated that "every" combination in re-
plied to unions"). Compare EDWARD BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN AcT 1-98
(1930) (reviewing congressional history and arguing that Congress did not intend the Act
to apply to labor unions), with ALPHEUS T. MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW
119-42 (1925) (arguing that congressional history indicates that the Act was intended to
apply to labor unions). One commentator has written that "[h]istorians of organized la-
bor's encounter with the Sherman Act often write in a bitterly ironic tone. Through a
triumph of sharp lawyering, so the story goes, a statute passed with the support of organ-
ized labor to punish the robber barons was turned into a scourge of trade unionism."
Daniel R. Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908-1914,74 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1151 (1989).
86. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 801-02.
87. See United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1895); United States v. Debs, 64
F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894); In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828 (N.D. 11. 1894); United
States v. Agler, 62 F. 824 (C.C.D. Ind. 1894); Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co.,
62 F. 803 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1894); United States v. Elliott, 62 F. 801 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1894);
Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 F. 149 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1893); United States v. Workingmen's
Amalgamated Council, 54 F. 994 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893), affd, 57 F. 85 (5th Cir. 1893).
Most of these cases resulted from the Pullman Strike of 1894. See BERMAN, supra note
85, at 3 & n.5.
88. 208 U.S. 274 (1908). This case is sometimes referred to as the "Danbury Hatters"
case.
89. A secondary boycott occurs when a union boycotts parties other than the em-
ployer that it is targeting. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
466 (1921) (distinguishing "primary boycott," when a union merely refrains from dealing
with its employer and peacefully tries to dissuade customers from dealing with the em-
ployer, from a "secondary boycott," when a union pressures, coerces, or threatens actual
and prospective customers of the employer in such a way that they fear "loss or damage
to themselves should they deal with [that employer]").
In Loewe, the members of a local hatters' union tried to force the hat factory in
which they worked to unionize. See Loewe, 208 U.S. at 305. When the factory owner
resisted, the local union joined forces with the American Federation of Labor and threat-
ened wholesale hat buyers with a boycott if they purchased hats from the targeted factory.
See id. at 305-06. They also threatened to boycott any retailers who bought the factory's
hats through wholesalers. See id. at 306-07. The wholesalers and retailers whom the un-
ion threatened to boycott included some outside of the state, meaning that the union's
actions had an effect on interstate commerce. See icL at 307-08.
90. See Loewe, 208 U.S. at 309.
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straint of trade was illegal.9' The Court explained that "[t]he act
made no distinction between classes,"' and that "it include[d] combi-
nations which are composed of laborers."
Congress responded to the Court's decision in Loewe by passing
the Clayton Act in 1914." Among other provisions, section 6 of the
Act96 declared that labor was not an "article of commerce" and that
"[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid
the existence and operation of labor ... organizations, instituted for
the purposes of mutual help, ... from lawfully carrying out the le-
gitimate objects thereof." 7 Section 20 of the Act" expressly limited
the ability of courts to issue injunctions or restraining orders in re-
sponse to many kinds of labor union activity." It further stated that
the labor activities listed in the Act should not "be considered or held
to be violations of any law of the United States."" Despite the lan-
guage of the Clayton Act, controversy remained over the extent to
which the activities of organized labor were exempt from the Sher-
man Act.'0 ' While some viewed the Clayton Act "as labor's 'Magna
Carta,' wholly exempting labor from any possible inclusion in the
Anti-trust legislation,"' 2 others saw it as merely maintaining the
status quo and continuing to forbid actions such as secondary boy-
91. See id. at 301.
92. Id.
93. Id at 302.
94. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and
29 U.S.C.).
95. See Ernst, supra note 85, at 1151 ("[Loewe] reinvigorated the sporadic campaign
of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) for legislation that would exempt organized
labor from the scope of the Sherman Act.").
96. Ch. 323, § 6,38 Stat. at 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994)).
97. Id.
98. Ch. 323, § 20,38 Stat. at 738 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994)).
99. See id. ("No restraining order or injunction shall be granted ... in any case be-
tween an employer and employees ... involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
property....").
100. Id.
101. See, eg., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1945)
(discussing the controversy); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,230 (1941) (same).
102. Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 804-05; see also Ernst, supra note 85, at 1172
("Doubtless some hoped ... that by excluding labor from the category of 'articles of
commerce' the Act would immunize organized labor from proceedings under the Sher-
man Act by putting it beyond the commerce power of the federal government."); Joseph
Kovner, The Legislative History of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 749,
765 (1947) (arguing that congressional history makes it clear that Congress intended to
exempt labor unions from the reach of the Sherman Act).
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The Supreme Court adopted the latter view in Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deerng,°4 which held that the Clayton Act did not ex-
empt secondary boycotts from antitrust liability."5 The Court stated
that the Clayton Act applied only to parties who were in an em-
ployer-employee relationship; thus, if union members who worked
for other employers sympathetically joined a boycott, the combined
unions' actions were subject to the antitrust laws.' 6 Justice Brandeis,
joined by Justices Holmes and Clarke, wrote a vigorous dissent, ad-
vocating the view that the Clayton Act was written to allow
competitive relations between labor and management and that courts
should not intervene and impose their own views of what is or is not
appropriate.' 7
Congress again enacted new legislation in the form of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932."' Perhaps in response to the dissenting views
of Justice Brandeis, 9 the new Act was clearly "intended to discour-
age judicial activism in labor disputes" by further restricting courts'
103. See Ernst, supra note 85, at 1166.
104. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
105. See id at 478. Labor supporters felt that the Court had subverted Congress's
intent. See Ernst, supra note 85, at 1166. Others thought that Congress had not made its
intent clear and "placed the blame for confusion over the statute at the feet of 'a pusil-
lanimous Congressional committee of lawyers who were willing to draft a deceitful statute
and shield themselves of the wrath of labor behind the Supreme Court of the United
States.'" Id at 1166-67 (quoting Labor is Not a Commodity, 9 NEw REPUBLIC 112, 114
(1916)); see also Kovner, supra note 102, at 760 ("Did the Court read the [congressional]
debates and then decide ... that Congress had compromised a hot issue by leaving it to
the courts to interpret deliberately ambiguous language?").
106. See Duplex, 254 U.S. at 472. The Court noted that "Congress had in mind par-
ticular industrial controversies, not a general class war." Id. One commentator has
written that the Court of the 1920s developed an approach that "emptied the vague labor
clauses of the Clayton Act of any significance." Meltzer, supra note 1, at 665; see also
Kovner, supra note 102, at 765 (stating that the Duplex Court "refused to give [section 6
of the Clayton Act] any meaning or authority").
107. See Duplex, 254 U.S. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justices Holmes and Bran-
deis again dissented in a similar case decided six years later. See Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37, 54-55 (1927) (holding that a union vio-
lated the Sherman Act when it tried to pressure a limestone producer into re-unionizing
by having its union members in other areas refuse to handle the producer's stone); id at
51 (Brandeis, 3., dissenting).
108. Ch. 90,47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1994)).
109. The Court in Brown noted that Congress enacted the labor statutes "in part to
adopt the views of dissenting justices in Duplex." Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120; see also Lo-
cal 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 725 (1965) (separate
opinion of Goldberg, J.) (stating that Congress "expressly repudiated [the holding of Du-
plex] in favor Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissenting views").
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ability to issue restraining orders and injunctions."' This time, Con-
gress carefully enumerated exempt activities and included a separate
definitional section.. in which "labor dispute" was defined broadly to
exempt the type of union activity that the Court had attacked in Du-
plex.112  Congress's intent to protect organized labor activity was
clear, as the Act spoke of the "individual unorganized worker [being]
commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract.1 .. More
legislation followed three years later when Congress enacted the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (the "Wagner Act")," a statute that went
beyond merely discouraging judicial activism by speaking of the
"right" of employees to organize in the interest of fostering collective
bargaining."5 The Wagner Act also established the NLRB to review
unfair labor practices of employers.116
Following this legislation, the Court for the first time retreated
from interjecting antitrust law into labor disputes in Apex Hosiery
Co. v. Leader."' While it recognized that union members had im-
peded interstate commerce by engaging in a sit-down strike in the
factory and refusing to allow shipments to go out,"8 the Court held
that the union members' actions were not the type at which the
Sherman Act was directed."9 Looking to the legislative history of the
Act and the type of activity it was intended to proscribe,n the Court
concluded that the Act's target had been business trusts that were
trying to achieve market control by suppressing competition. The
statute was not aimed at "policing" the movement of goods in inter-
state commerce.' The Court noted that it was not the union's intent
to restrain competition, but merely to pressure the employer into
meeting the union's demands.2' As such, the union's actions were
unlike the secondary boycotts previously held unlawful under the
110. Milton Handler & William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust
Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 459,471 (1981).
111. Ch. 90, § 13, 47 Stat. at 73 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1994)).
112. See Duplex, 254 U.S. at 463 (describing activity of a secondary boycott).
113. Ch. 90, § 2,47 Stat. at 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)).
114. Ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).
115. See id. § 1, 49 Stat. at 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994)).
116. See id. § 3, 49 Stat. at 451 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1994)).
117. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
118. See id. at 486.
119. See id. at 501.
120. See id. at 489.
121. See id at 492-93.
122. See ida t 490.
123. See id. at 501.
1044 [Vol. 75
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY
Sherman Act. 24
Labor scored another victory a year later in the landmark Su-
preme Court decision United States v. Hutcheson.2 In Hutcheson,
union workers who had lost work to a competing union responded by
calling a strike against an Anheuser-Busch plant, picketing it, and
asking other union members to join in boycotting Anheuser-Busch
products." Criminal antitrust charges were brought against the
striking union.27 By reading the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act together, the Court held that the union's activities
were not subject to the antitrust laws." The Court pointed to lan-
guage in the Clayton Act stating that certain enumerated union
activities should not be held to violate any federal laws1 29 and rea-
soned that it was only logical that such language should also be
applied to activities that the Norris-LaGuardia Act immunized from
injunctions."3 In short, any activity that was protected against injunc-
tions by the two labor statutes was also immune from the antitrust
laws; such reasoning would extend immunity to the secondary boy-
cotts held to violate the antitrust laws in the Court's prior decisions."'
Apex and Hutcheson thus established a new trend conferring
124. See id. at 506-07. In the same year, the Court decided Milk Wagon Drivers' Un-
ion, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U.S. 91 (1940). In that case,
unionized milk drivers began picketing stores that were buying discount milk from non-
unionized, independent milk "peddlers." See id. at 94-96. The stores brought suit under
the Sherman Act, claiming the union drivers were engaging in an illegal secondary boy-
cott. See id. at 96. The Court, however, stated that it was not a secondary boycott, but a
valid "labor dispute" as broadly defined in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See id. at 100. As
such, it was not susceptible to antitrust law: "Congress made abundantly clear their inten-
tion that what they regarded as the misinterpretation of the Clayton Act should not be
repeated in the construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.... [To hold a violation of the
Sherman Act here] would reverse the declared purpose of Congress." Id. at 103.
125. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
126. See id. at 227-28.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 235-36.
129. See id at 236. For the relevant text of the Clayton Act, see supra notes 96-100
and accompanying text.
130. See Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 234. The Court noted that immunizing an activity
from injunction, but then holding it susceptible to criminal prosecution, "is to say that that
which on the equity side of the court is allowable conduct may in a criminal proceeding
become the road to prison." Id at 234-35. Nonetheless, one commentator characterized
the Court's assessment of the interdependence of the two statutes as a "startling conclu-
sion." Theodore J. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62
VA. L. REV. 603,607 (1976).
131. See Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 252,265 (1955) ("[T]he practical consequence [of Hutcheson] was to make
the Sherman Act inapplicable to all combinations of employees regardless of the objec-
tive.").
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broad antitrust immunity upon unilateral union activity. The two
cases had not, however, addressed whether an employer-employee
agreement that restrained trade would be similarly immune. 2 Ini-
tially, it would seem that agreements made as a result of required
bargaining activity should enjoy exemption from antitrust scrutiny
because national labor policy encourages such agreements, even if
they incidentally restrain trade. 3 Alternatively, if such agreements
could be made to the detriment of third-party competitors, the labor
exemption theoretically should not provide a haven for activity which
the Sherman Act was meant to prohibit."34
The Court addressed this issue four years after Hutcheson and,
despite its recently evident predisposition not to apply antitrust law
to labor issues, concluded in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union
No. 33 that there remained certain labor situations where antitrust
law must be applied.1 36 In Allen Bradley, the Court ruled that it was a
Sherman Act violation for labor unions, even if acting in pursuit of
their own legitimate interests, "to combine with employers and with
manufacturers of goods to restrain competition in, and to monopolize
the marketing of, such goods."' 37 New York City electrical workers,
in an attempt to secure better wages and working conditions, had
gradually unionized the shops of most electrical manufacturers.'38 As
a consequence, the manufacturers agreed to sell only to contractors
that employed union members. 9 Eventually, the unions, the manu-
facturers, and the local contractors all began working together to
boycott local contractors who would not unionize, as well as outside
equipment suppliers who tried to sell in the city.' The three groups
132. After Apex and Hutcheson, "[w]hat remained for the Court was further elucida-
tion of the problem adumbrated in Hutcheson-the treatment of union-employer
combinations that achieved price restraints, production allocation or other market-control
schemes, proscribed for employers acting without labor unions." Meltzer, supra note 1, at
669.
133. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
711-12 (1965) (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.).
134. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,325 U.S. 797,808 (1945) ("[W]e
think Congress never intended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman Act, aid
non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control- the marketing of goods
and services.").
135. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
136. See id. at 809.
137. Id at 798; see also id. at 810 (stating that labor unions should not be free to en-
gage in conduct that restrains trade).
138. See id at 799-800.
139. See id.
140. See id&
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soon completely monopolized the New York City market.'
The Court stated that if the unions had been acting alone and
their activities incidentally had resulted in a monopoly, the labor laws
would have exempted them from Sherman Act liability. 2 This ex-
emption would have applied even if the same monopolistic, higher
price levels obtained as a result of the unions' unilateral actions.
However, because the unions had "participated with a combination
of business men who had complete power to eliminate all competi-
tion among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a
situation was created not included within the exemptions of the Clay-
ton and Norris-La Guardia Acts."144
Although Apex, Hutcheson, and Allen Bradley established fairly
clear guidelines regarding the permissible scope of union activity un-
der the antitrust laws, " political perceptions of the scope of
permissible union activity under the labor laws changed in the years
following these three cases." Congress, concluding that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act had created unfair favoritism
toward labor,'47 sought to "correct the imbalance"'48 by amending the
Wagner Act with the Taft-Hartley Act'49 in 1947. The language of the
141. See id. at 800.
142. See id. at 809.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. It has been argued that the "trilogy" of Apex, Hutcheson, and Allen Bradley es-
tablished the correct balance between antitrust and labor law and thus delineated the
circumstances in which it was proper for courts to intervene and apply antitrust law in the
labor arena. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 482-83 (explaining the balance set
forth by these cases); id. at 513-14 (urging the Court to "return to the tenets of the Apex-
Hutcheson-Allen Bradley trilogy"); cf. ALBION GUILFORD TAYLOR, LABOR AND THE
SUPREME COURT 100-04 (1961) (stating that the "[Apex] analysis," which was utilized in
Allen Bradley, "represents a reasonable and workable guide"). The framework of the
three cases dictated that if unions acted unilaterally and their activities were immune
from injunctions under the labor statutes, then the courts would refrain from applying
antitrust law to the resultant labor situations unless the union actually conspired with
employers to implement price and market restraints and injure competitors. See Handler
& Zifchak, supra note 110, at 483.
146. See HARRY A. MILLIs & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER Acr TO
TAFr-HARTLEY 377-78 (1950) (recounting the 1947 Senate debates during which "stress
was placed on the fact that the Wagner Act and the Norris-La Guardia Act were experi-
mental in nature, and that the experiment, though not entirely unsuccessful, showed that
changes were necessary"); see also 93 CONG. REC. 4131 (1947) (statement of Sen. Al-
lender) (discussing defects in previous legislation).
147. See MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 146, at 377-78.
148. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 472.
149. Ch. 120,61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1994)).
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Wagner Act was changed to make its policy more two-sided,"0 and
certain forms of secondary boycotts,' as well as closed-shop agree-
ments,'52 were outlawed.'53 The Wagner Act was amended again by
the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959,"M which further sought to restrict
the realm of legal union activity. Although Congress declared certain
labor activity unlawful, ' the remedies for violations were set out ex-
pressly in the labor laws with no mention of the applicability of
antitrust law.'56
150. See ch. 120, § 1, 61 Stat. at 136-37 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1994)). While the original policy statement of the Wagner Act had spoken primarily of
the right of labor to organize and the disadvantages of not allowing it to do so, the
amended version added language suggesting that labor was just as capable as manage-
ment of being a destructive force on commerce:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor or-
ganizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect
of burdening or obstructing commerce ... which impair the interest of the pub-
lic .... The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the
assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.
Id.
The Court utilized the Taft-Hartley Act to give some leeway, or protection, to em-
ployer activity in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) (often
referred to as "Buffalo Linen"). The Court held that it was not an unfair labor practice
for a multi-employer bargaining group to lock out its employees during contract negotia-
tions, see id, at 97, even though the union was not striking against all the employers in the
unit at the time, see id. at 90. The Court noted the several references to "lock-outs" in the
Taft-Hartley Act, concluding that this was "statutory recognition that there are circum-
stances in which employers may lawfully resort to the lockout as an economic weapon."
Id. at 92-93. This is one of the earlier decisions in which the Court advocated the ability
of the employer to engage in "self-help." Id. at 96.
151. See ch. 120, § 8(b)(4), 61 Stat. at 141, amended by Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257,73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994)).
152. See ch. 120, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. at 140 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1994)). A "closed-shop agreement" results when an employer agrees to em-
ploy only union members in a particular location. An "open-shop" employs both union
and non-union personnel. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
462 (1921) (discussing "open-shop" versus "closed-shop" policy).
153. Two commentators, writing shortly after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,
stated that it "changed the legal framework rather drastically .... [T]he hands of the
clock ... were turned back so as to give the federal government a substantially different
labor policy from that adopted in the 1930's, one much less acceptable in many respects."
MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 146, at 456.
154. Pub. L. No. 86-257,73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at scattered sections
of 29 and 45 U.S.C. (1994)).
155. See id. § 704(a), 73 Stat. at 542-43 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(4)(i) (1994)) (further restricting secondary boycotts); id. § 704(b), 73 Stat. at
543-44 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1994)) (outlawing most "hot cargo"
agreements, which occur when an employer enters agreement with its employees that it
will not deal with certain other employers).
156. See id. § 704(e), 73 Stat. at 545 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 187(a)
(1994)); TAYLOR, supra note 145, at 107. But cf. MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 146, at
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Nevertheless, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court expressed a re-
newed willingness to apply antitrust law to the labor arena.'
Perhaps the Court intended to reinforce the philosophy behind the
Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts-the imposition of a bar-
gaining "balance" between labor and management.15 However, some
commentators have argued that the Court went too far, perhaps re-
sulting in an "overcorrection" that put courts and antitrust law
intrusively back into labor law and impinged on the jurisdiction of
the NLRB. 5'
On the same day in 1965, the Court decided two related cases
that raised the issue of "whether a collective bargaining agreement
on a mandatory subject was a basis for antitrust liability..'... In the
first case, United Mine Workers v. Pennington,6' unionized mine
workers had negotiated a wage scale with a multi-employer group of
large mining companies and agreed to impose the same scale on the
smaller mining competitors, regardless of the smaller competitors'
ability to pay the agreed upon wages. 62 The Court63 noted that al-
500 (writing in 1950 that "[t]he possible impact of [the remedy section of the Taft-Hartley
Act] upon cases against unions under the Sherman Antitrust Act is not entirely clear ....
While the antitrust acts were not specifically mentioned or amended, ... a new statutory
framework was created into which Antitrust Act decisions must be fitted.").
157. See, e.g., Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
158. See supra notes 147-56 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of, and
Congress's intention in passing, the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts).
159. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 513 (criticizing the Pennington/Jewel
Tea Courts' approach as "resurrecting the most hateful labor-antitrust precedents").
160. Id at 483; see Local 189, Almagamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). Under the labor
laws regarding collective bargaining, "mandatory subjects" of such bargaining are "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see
NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,349 (1958).
161. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
162. See iL at 660. Allegedly, the union and the large mining companies had agreed
that the problems of the coal industry related to overproduction. Thus, they sought to
pressure the smaller mining companies out of business. See id.
163. In both cases, the Justices were split into three groups. Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, wrote the opinion of the Court in each. See id.
at 659; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 679. Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark concurred in the
judgment in Pennington, but would have based the decision on Allen Bradley rather than
employing a balancing test. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 672 (Douglas, J., concurring).
These three Justices dissented in Jewel Tea, again advocating the application of Allen
Bradley. See 381 U.S. 676, 735-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Goldberg, Harlan,
and Stewart disagreed with the reasoning in both of the Court's opinions; Justice Gold-
berg wrote a single separate opinion "dissenting from the opinion but concurring in the
reversal" of Pennington, which was remanded, and concurring in the judgment of Jewel
Tea. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 697 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.); infra notes 171-
77 and accompanying text.
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though wages were a mandatory subject of bargaining under the la-
bor laws, the agreement between the union and the employers was
not automatically exempt from antitrust law.1" It then sought to bal-
ance the interests of the national labor policy and the policies behind
the antitrust law, and concluded that antitrust policies prevailed.65
The second case, Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co.,'" addressed an agreement between a butchers' union and a
group of retail grocery stores in Chicago that limited the hours during
which the stores could sell fresh meat.'67 Jewel Tea wanted to sell
fresh meat outside of those hours by way of a self-serve meat counter,
and when the union refused to agree to this, Jewel Tea brought an
antitrust suit.'" The Court once again engaged in a balancing test be-
tween the interests of labor law and antitrust policy, this time finding
that the interest of the union in controlling working conditions69 out-
weighed antitrust considerations.'
164. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65. The Court conceded that wages "lie at the
very heart" of mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA and that a union's
reaching an agreement on wages with a multi-employer bargaining group does not violate
the antitrust laws. See id. at 664. However, the Court explained that the NLRA must be
harmonized with the Sherman Act, and thus "there are limits to what a union or an em-
ployer may offer or extract in the name of wages." Id. at 665. The fact that employers
and employees must bargain over wages "does not mean that the agreement reached may
disregard other laws." Id.
165. See id. at 666-69. The Court noted that while labor policy encourages employees
to bargain as a group and permits them to obtain uniform wage levels, it is not a goal of
the national labor policy to have the employees and employers in one bargaining unit
determine the wages (or other terms of employment) for other bargaining units or for the
whole industry. See id. at 666. The policy behind antitrust law, on the other hand, is to
prevent such an agreement. See id, at 668. Moreover, the Court noted that when a union
agrees with one employer to seek a certain wage level from other employers, it
"surrenders its freedom of action with respect to its bargaining policy," which constitutes
a restraint that conflicts with antitrust policy. Id.
166. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
167. See id. at 680.
168. See id. at 679-81.
169. Working "conditions" are among the mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
170. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-90. The Court explained that the restriction on
hours was "so intimately related to [the mandatory bargaining subjects of] wages, hours
and working conditions" that national labor policy protected it from antitrust attack. Id.
While acknowledging that the restriction on hours would have an effect on competition,
"perhaps more so than in the case of the wage agreement [in Pennington]," the Court
noted that the union's interest in the restriction was "immediate and direct" and thus
outweighed the concerns of antitrust law. Id. at 691.
As one commentator notes, "[t]he opinion, however, failed to provide a broad per-
spective on how to identify labor and antitrust interests, much less how to weigh them."
Lee Goldman, The Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws as Applied to Employers' La-
bor Market Restraints in Sports and Non-sports Markets, 1989 UTAH L. REV. 617, 651; see
1997] ANTITRUST IMMUNITY 1051
Justice Goldberg wrote a lengthy separate opinion,' vehemently
disagreeing with the Court's approach in both cases.'12 He sharply
criticized the Court for interjecting antitrust law into labor disputes,
which he asserted was contrary to clear congressional intent and rep-
resented a foray into a field in which the Court had no expertise.3
Justice Goldberg called the Court's willingness to intervene "a
throwback to past days"'74 and said that labor legislation was designed
also Meltzer, supra note 1, at 725 (suggesting that the Court's "balancing approach" in
Jewel Tea was not in fact very balanced because it primarily took account of the union's
interests while essentially ignoring the antitrust considerations).
As far as reconciling Pennington with Jewel Tea, one commentator offers the follow-
ing distinction: "[I]n Jewel Tea the allegedly anticompetitive effect of the agreement fell
solely on grocers who were members of the employer bargaining unit, whereas in Pen-
nington the anticompetitive impact fell on plaintiff parties who were outside the
bargaining unit and whose ... interests were thus not represented at the bargaining ta-
ble." Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case
of Sports League Labor Market Restraints, 75 GEo. L.J. 19, 67 (1986).
171. Local 189 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 697 (1965)
(separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). In this single separate opinion, Justice Goldberg dis-
sented from the opinion in Pennington and concurred in the judgment in Jewel Tea. See
id. at 697 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). The opinion expressed disagreement with
the reasoning in both cases. See id. at 697-700,714-30 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.).
It is mentioned here because it figured prominently in the Brown majority opinion. See
Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120, 2121, 2123, 2125-26; infra notes 322-30 and accompanying text.
A significant part of Justice Goldberg's separate opinion, dealing with the history of the
Sherman Act's application to labor issues, has been characterized as an "essay" that was
"an instrument of advocacy rather than of inquiry." Meltzer, supra note 1, at 729.
172. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697-700, 714-30 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.).
Commentators have criticized the Court's opinions in Pennington and Jewel Tea as well.
One commentator has stated that the decisions not only "failed to shed much light on a
dark corner of the law," but "failed also to exhibit ... even a serious effort by the mem-
bers of the Court to state clearly and to grapple with the problems raised by the
competing approaches of their colleagues and by the precedents." Meltzer, supra note 1,
at 734. Another criticized the adoption of a balancing test, maintaining that such a test
"tends to lead to unprincipled and inconsistent decisionmaking. Justice White's opinion
[in Jewel Tea] tells courts to balance the importance of a particular restraint to union
members against the magnitude of its anticompetitive effect," which is impracticable and
leads to decisions made on the basis of a judge's personal perceptions. Leslie, supra note
1, at 1217.
173. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 697 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). "The judicial
expressions in [Jewel Tea] represent another example of the reluctance of judges to give
full effect to congressional purpose in this area and the substitution by judges of their
views for those of Congress as to how free collective bargaining should operate." Id. at
726 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). The lack of expertise that "antitrust courts" have
in regard to labor issues was a theme which both Justice Goldberg and the Brown Court
stressed. Interestingly, at least one commentator has suggested that perhaps courts lack
the expertise to apply even antitrust law. See Michael Boudin, Observations, 59 AN-
TITRUST L.J. 131, 131-33 (1990). The suggestion is that an administrative agency,
presumably analogous to the NLRB in the labor relations area, would be better able to
bring consistency, expertise, and predictability to antitrust law. See id.
174. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 700 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). "The Court in
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to prevent "the lawfulness of union conduct [from turning on] subjec-
tive judgments of purpose or effect."'75 Urging a return to judicial
abstention in the vein of Apex and Hutcheson,'76 he stated that "[t]o
apply the antitrust laws at this late date to [labor agreements] would
endanger the stability which now characterizes collective bargain-
ing."17
7
Choosing not to subscribe to the views of Justice Goldberg, the
Court declined the request to reconsider the Pennington holding in
1971,178 and in 1975 decided Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.' In a decision that some thought
"compounded the errors of Pennington and Jewel Tea,"' the Court
for the first time expressly recognized a "nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion" from the antitrust laws. 81 In Connell, a union pressured a
contractor into signing a contract wherein he promised to subcontract
mechanical work only to firms with whom the union currently had an
agreement." After signing under protest, the contractor brought an
antitrust claim against the union.'
The Connell Court noted that while labor statutes such as the
Norris-LaGuardia and Clayton Acts expressly exempt certain union
[Pennington] today ignores [the] history of the discredited judicial attempt to apply the
antitrust laws to legitimate collective bargaining activity .... " Id. at 713 (separate opin-
ion of Goldberg, J.).
175. Id. at 707 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). Justice Goldberg stated that the
history of labor and antitrust law "makes clear that Congress intended to foreclose judges
and juries from roaming at large in the area of collective bargaining, under cover of the
antitrust laws, by inquiry into the purpose and motive of the employer and union bar-
gaining on mandatory subjects." IE at 716 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.); cf. Brown,
116 S. Ct. at 2123, 2125-26 (refusing to construct a system of antitrust review where the
courts would have to examine an employer's "purpose or motive").
176. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 709 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). "The Court's
holding in [Pennington] today flies in the face of [Apex] and [Hutcheson] and restrains
collective bargaining in the same way as did the holding of the majority in [Duplex]-a
holding which Congress has expressly repudiated in favor of Mr. Justice Brandeis' dis-
senting views." Id at 725; cf. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120 (stating that Congress enacted
labor statutes in response to Justice Brandeis' dissent).
177. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 732 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.); cf. Brown, 116 S.
Ct. at 2123 (stating that "to permit antitrust liability [in the context of this case] threatens
to introduce instability and uncertainty into the collective-bargaining process").
178. See Ramsey v. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1971)
(declining request to reconsider its 1965 holding on facts similar to those in Pennington).
179. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
180. Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 486; see also St. Antoine, supra note 130, at
603 ("Connell, to say it straightaway, is an example neither of sound craftsmanship nor of
balanced judgment.").
181. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
182. See id at 619-20.
183. See id. at 620-21.
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activities from antitrust liability, nothing in the statutes exempts
agreements between union and management that result from collec-
tive bargaining and often restrain trade." The Court stated that it
"ha[d] recognized, however, that a proper accommodation between
the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the
NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in
business markets requires that some union-employer agreements be
accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanc-
tions."1  The Court nonetheless found that the exemption did not
apply to the agreement in Connell and held that the union could be
subject to antitrust sanctions because the agreement the contractor
had been pressured into signing had "a potential for restraining com-
petition in the business market in ways that would not follow
naturally from [the legitimate union objectives of] elimination of
competition over wages and working conditions."1
Furthermore, the Court took the unprecedented step of sug-
gesting that antitrust sanctions could apply to activities that were
deemed unfair labor practices under labor law.' Before Connell, it
appeared settled that only labor law remedies, as opposed to antitrust
remedies, were available for violations of labor law proscriptions."
Following Connell, some lower courts began finding that labor law
violations may "trigger[], rather than preclude[], an inquiry into the
availability of an antitrust exemption."9 Thus, the effect of Connell
184. See Id at 621-22.
185. It at 622. This was essentially the same principle that was implicitly recognized,
but unstated, in Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Apex. The Connell Court cited Jewel Tea in
support of the existence of the nonstatutory exemption. See id.
186. It at 635. The Court explained that the agreement "indiscriminately excluded
nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advan-
tages were not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from
more efficient operating methods." It at 623. Although the union's goal of organizing as
many workers as possible was legal, "the methods the union chose are not immune from
antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal." It at 625.
187. See id. at 634-35. Justice Stewart, expressing disagreement with such a step in his
dissent, argued that in enacting the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts, Congress
"rejected efforts to give private parties injured by [certain activities described in the Acts]
the right to seek relief under federal antitrust laws." I at 639 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
see also St. Antoine, supra note 130, at 626 (opining that allowing antitrust remedies in
this type of situation was "[tihe most egregious failure of the Connell majority to take
proper account of the policies of the labor laws").
188. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 486.
189. Id. at 489-90; see also Joshua Stein, Comment, Consolidated Express: Antitrust
Liability for Illegal Labor Activities, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 645, 648 (1980) (discussing the
post-Connell case Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494
(3d Cir. 1979), and noting that the circuit court "concluded that any violation of [a labor
law] deprives the union of its [antitrust] exemption").
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seems to have been the further insertion of antitrust law into the la-
bor arena.
Following Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell, the interplay be-
tween labor law and antitrust law was at best uncertain."m There is
some merit in the argument that the philosophy behind those three
decisions conflicts with congressional intent to keep antitrust law out
of labor issues.' Those cases could also be seen as unwarranted de-
partures from the precedent established by Apex, Hutcheson, and
Allen Bradley, which some believed reflected the correct balance be-
tween antitrust and labor law."n Furthermore, the Court itself was
divided in Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell."3 If the Court wanted
to curtail or even preclude application of antitrust law to the field of
labor relations, it could find both judicial and scholarly support for
such positions."
Regardless of the confusion following Connell as to the proper
role of antitrust law in labor relations, it was clear that a
"nonstatutory labor exemption" to the antitrust laws existed and
would be applied under certain circumstances. What remained un-
clear was the scope of the exemption.'95 The courts were largely in
190. "Pennington, Jewel Tea and Connell ... have placed the courts in the position of
resurrecting the most hateful labor-antitrust precedents. They are replete with ambiguity
and have produced chaos in the field of labor-antitrust." Handler & Zifchak, supra note
110, at 513. These commentators conclude that, following Connell, the courts are apply-
ing "a confused body of law, whose principal attribute is uncertainty." Id. at 514.
Another commentator writes that "the Court's labor and antitrust analysis [in Pennington,
Jewel Tea, and Connell] was confused and the subject of great criticism." Goldman, supra
note 170, at 652.
191. See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 697,700-09
(1965) (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.).
192- See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 482-83, 513-14; TAYLOR, supra note
145, at 100-04.
193. Connell was a five-to-four decision. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steanfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Justice Stewart, joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that labor remedies
should have been exclusive and that it was counter to congressional intent to apply anti-
trust law in that situation. See id. at 639-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas also
wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See id. at 638 (Douglas, J., dissenting). For the divi-
sion of the Court in Pennington and Jewel Tea, see supra note 163.
194. See, e.g., Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 513 ("We urge that the Court
return to the tenets of the Apex-Hutcheson-Allen Bradley trilogy."); Jacobs & Winter,
supra note 64, at 22 (arguing that antitrust law is inapplicable with respect to parties in a
collective bargaining relationship). Long before Connell, the wisdom of applying antitrust
law to the labor arena was questioned. See Cox, supra note 131, at 261. Professor Cox
argued that "[s]ince the general run of labor disputes has little to do with the preservation
of a competitive economy, antitrust doctrines throw scant light on the best means of re-
solving the conflicts of interest among employers, employees and labor unions." Id.
195. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
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conflict as to the activities that enjoyed the exemption and the
breadth with which the exemption should be applied in order to pro-
tect the collective bargaining process.196
The Connell Court stated that certain "union-employer agree-
ments" must be protected by the exemptioni" because labor law
obligated employers and employees to bargain on certain mandatory
terms of employment.1 98 The agreements that resulted from this bar-
gaining, looked at in isolation, would appear to have terms that
restrained commerce in violation of the Sherman Act.1" While the
labor statutes expressly exempted organized labor activity that took
place during the bargaining process, no statute expressly exempted
the resulting agreement. 0 Thus, in order to avoid the absurd result
of encouraging collective bargaining agreements under the labor laws
only to find those agreements illegal under the antitrust laws, the
courts were forced to immunize the resulting agreements from anti-
trust attack."°
(noting that "there has been much debate over the years regarding the scope of the ex-
emption" and that it "never has been conclusively delimited"), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116
(1996); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting that "the pre-
cise contours of [the exemption] are neither clear nor entirely coherent"), affd in par4
rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Lock, supra note 14, at 352 ("The scope of
[the] nonstatutory labor exemption is not precisely defined."); Kieran M. Corcoran, Note,
When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in Professional
Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1045, 1052 (1994) ("The breadth of the exemption ... is es-
sentially based upon issues of public policy. Courts make decisions with no precise
congressional guidance, and therefore a particular decision-maker's political philosophy
or economic orientation can greatly influence the outcome. Consequently, the exemption
has been applied and interpreted with considerable inconsistency.").
196. Compare Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 130-34 (D.D.C. 1991)
(holding that the exemption should expire when the agreement expires), rev'd, 50 F.3d
1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996), with Powell v. National Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1302-03 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that the exemption survives the
expiration of the agreement and can possibly last beyond impasse); see also infra notes
211-39 and accompanying text (discussing courts' differing interpretations of the scope of
the exemption).
197. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
198. The NLRA imposes an obligation on employers and unions to bargain collec-
tively "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
199. See Connell, 421 U.S. at 622. The Court noted that employees, bargaining collec-
tively as a union, can obtain more standardized wages than they could if they bargained
individually. See id. This standardization of wages "ultimately will affect price competi-
tion among employers," which would theoretically give rise to antitrust liability. Id.
200. See id
201. See id (noting that while standardized wages that unions bargain for "ultimately
will affect price competition among employers, ... the goals of federal labor law never
could be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a violation of the anti-
trust laws").
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Yet it became clear that immunizing only the collective bar-
gaining agreement might not go far enough in promoting the
collective bargaining process.m With only the agreement itself ex-
empted, employers would be subject to antitrust liability the moment
an agreement expired. 3 This consequence had the potential to frus-
trate the national policy of collective bargaining because it could
serve to reduce the incentive of employees to continue bargaining
toward a new agreement after a former one had expired.' Armed
with the threat of an antitrust suit, employees might be reluctant to
come to a quick and fair agreement."' In addition, employer groups
would be inhibited in their bargaining offers due to fear of antitrust
sanctions. 6 In order to protect the collective bargaining process,
many thought that the nonstatutory exemption should continue to
shield the activities of the process after expiration of an agreement.27
However, because most employee bargaining activities already
enjoyed statutory exemptions under labor law,00 extending the non-
statutory exemption to "protect the bargaining process" effectively
meant extending antitrust protection to the activities of employers.2
202. See, e.g., Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.NJ.
1987) (arguing that viewing the exemption as expiring with the agreement is "unrealistic"
because post-expiration negotiations toward a new agreement are still subject to the dic-
tates of labor law and should thus be protected from antitrust law); Roberts, supra note
170, at 81 ("The NLRA does not mandate agreements, it mandates a process. This fact is
central to the theme that the nonstatutory exemption protects more than just agree-
ments.").
203. See Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965 (arguing that it would be anomalous to main-
tain that bargained-for restraints "lose [their] immunity automatically upon expiration of
the agreement").
204. See Lock, supra note 14, at 383 (noting that NFL team owners argue that allowing
unions to bring antitrust suits "effectively permits the union to dictate terms of employ-
ment, thereby creating a strong disincentive for the union to bargain in good faith").
205. See iL
206. Employers may be "reluctant to agree to potentially anticompetitive restraints,
even where desired by their employees, for fear that such practices would expose them to
antitrust suits during any period between agreements." Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966.
207. See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1301-02 (8th Cir. 1989);
Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965-66; Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep
Drive to Collective Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 685, 774-75 (1981); Goldman, supra note 170, at 671; infra notes 221-51 and ac-
companying text.
20& See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975) (noting that Clayton Act and Norris-La Guardia Act exempt
certain union activity from antitrust liability).
209. One might conceive of the collective bargaining "process" as being composed of
three elements: the activities of employees, the activities of employers, and the agree-
ment that is reached between the two. With the activities of employees being (for the
most part) immunized statutorily, and the agreements being immunized by the nonstatu-
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Because the original purpose of the labor statutes had been to posi-
tion employees on level bargaining ground with employers, one line
of thought was that granting additional powers to the employers un-
dermined the purpose of labor laws and created an unbalanced
bargaining environment. 0
In the cases following Connell and leading up to Brown, lower
courts struggled with the scope of the exemption. Some adhered to
the literal language of Connell, applying the exemption only to bar-
gaining agreements. 1 To protect the bargaining activities of both
sides, others advocated an approach that would extend the exemption
beyond expiration of an agreement until the point when a bargaining
impasse was reached, or even beyond."' None of these cases, how-
ever, reached the Supreme Court, and thus the scope of the
exemption remained unclear. Because the most visible of these cases
involved professional sports, and since Brown followed in their vein
and addressed the specific issue they raised, the sports cases will be
primarily used to show the differing positions."3
tory exemption as explained in Connell, presumably the only element left to be affected
by a broadening of the nonstatutory exemption is the activities of employers.
At least one lower court examined the nonstatutory exemption in its early stages and
concluded that it did not apply to protect employers at all. See Robertson v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Courts in subsequent cases
held employers to be protected, but the degree of the employer's protection in each case
was a function of how broadly or narrowly that particular court defined the scope of the
exemption. See infra notes 214-39 and accompanying text.
210. The dissent in the D.C. Circuit decision in Brown argued that although collective
bargaining seeks a balance in strength between employers and employees, "we
must.., be mindful that 'a primary purpose of the National Labor Relations Act was to
redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and manage-
ment ... by conferring certain affirmative rights on employees and by placing certain
enumerated restrictions on the activities of employers.'" Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50
F.3d 1041, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965)), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116
(1996).
211. See, e.g., McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1979)
(agreeing with other courts that exemption applies only in the presence of an agreement
that is the result of arm's-length bargaining); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742
(D.D.C. 1976) ("[T]he thrust of the cases [is that] a scheme advantageous to employers
and otherwise in violation of the antitrust laws cannot under any circumstances come
within the [scope of the] exemption unless and until it becomes part of a collective bar-
gaining agreement .... "), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
212. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302-03; Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966-67.
213. Sports cases have a unique relationship with the nonstatutory exemption. One
commentator explains:
[In non-sports cases] the availability of the labor exemption is usually tested in a
suit brought by an employer or third party who is adversely affected by a union-
proposed restriction included within a collective bargaining agreement; the un-
ion typically seeks to avoid liability by asserting the labor exemption as a
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Just one year after the Supreme Court had expressly recognized
the nonstatutory exemption in Connell, the Eighth Circuit addressed
the scope of the exemption in Mackey v. National Football League."
In Mackey, the players claimed that the League's enforcement of a
rule restraining player movement among teams"'5 violated the Sher-
man Act.216 Although the court noted that the "nonstatutory labor
exemption" applied to certain employer activity as well as employee
activity,' the court held that the League's actions in these circum-
stances were not within the scope of the exemption.2
In discussing when labor policy would prevail over antitrust
principles, thereby allowing the nonstatutory exemption to protect
certain activities from antitrust ramifications, the Mackey court
fashioned a three-part test: The nonstatutory exemption would apply
when (1) only the parties to the bargaining agreement are primarily
affected; (2) the term at issue is a mandatory subject of bargaining;
and (3) the agreement "is the product of bona fide arm's-length bar-
gaining."29 Finding that the third prong of the test was not satisfied,
defense. However, in cases involving professional sports the plaintiff is gener-
ally a member of the union or the union itself, and the party raising the defense
of labor exemption is typically the employer; the defense is raised not for the
purpose of seeking immunity for a union-imposed restriction but rather to im-
munize an employer-devised restraint which may or may not have been
approved by the union.
WARREN FREEDMAN, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND ANTITRUST 52 (1987); see also Rob-
erts, supra note 170, at 62-63 (discussing the different factual settings of sports and non-
sports cases in regard to the application of the exemption).
214. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
215. The "Rozelle Rule" provided that when a player's contract with one team ex-
pired, and he wanted to sign a contract with a different team, the new team had to
compensate the player's former team. See iU at 609 n.1. If the two teams could not agree
on a price, then the Commissioner could compensate the former team with players or
draft choices as he saw fit. See id.
216. See id. at 609.
217. See id at 612. The court stated that because the purpose of the nonstatutory ex-
emption was to support the national policy favoring collective bargaining, and because it
exempted agreements, "the benefits of the exemption logically extend to both parties to
the agreement. Accordingly, under appropriate circumstances, we find that a non-labor
group may avail itself of the labor exemption." Id Interestingly, the court cited Justice
Goldberg's separate opinion from Jewel Tea in support. See id; see also supra notes 171-
77 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Goldberg's separate opinion). The court
also cited several pre-Connell cases that had implied an exemption for employer activity
in the collective bargaining process. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 612 (citing Scooper Dooper,
Inc. v. Kraftco Corp., 494 F.2d 840, 847 n.14 (3d Cir. 1974); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,499 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
21& See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616.
219. I& at 614. Several lower courts adopted the Mackey test in subsequent decisions.
See McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979); Zimmer-
man v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986); Wood v.
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the court held that the agreement which embodied the disputed rule
was not exempt from antitrust sanctions22
As noted, Mackey dealt with a signed agreement that was still in
effect, rather than with the issue of how long the exemption should
be applied once an agreement has expired. This latter issue was ad-
dressed by the District Court of New Jersey in Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Ass'n.22' In Bridgeman, an agreement that contained three
alleged restraints on players had recently expired.2m  Without an
agreement in place, the National Basketball Association (the
"NBA") continued to adhere to the terms of the expired agreement
and continued to impose the restraints. 4 The players claimed that
the continued imposition of the restraints under the expired agree-
ment constituted an antitrust violation and that the NBA's actions
were not shielded by the nonstatutory exemption. '
The district court endorsed the Mackey test as a "starting point,"
but decided that because the case dealt with an expired agreement, it
required "moving one step beyond Mackey."' 6 After balancing labor
and antitrust policies, 7 the court concluded that the interest of pre-
serving the bargaining process necessitated leaving the exemption in
place after expiration of an agreement.22s It also declined to proclaim
National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 809 F.2d 954 (2d
Cir. 1987).
Criticizing the third prong of the Mackey test, one commentator argues that the in-
quiry into whether an agreement is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining
"suggests that it is appropriate for a federal court to use the consumer welfare oriented
antitrust laws as a pretext for intervening in the collective bargaining process ... to apply
its own judgment to determine the fairness of a bargained agreement." Roberts, supra
note 170, at 78.
220. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. The district court found that there had been no
bona fide bargaining over the rule originally, but instead that the owners had unilaterally
imposed it years earlier when the players union was new and in a weak bargaining posi-
tion. See id. at 615-16. The district court had further found that although the rule
appeared in subsequent collective bargaining agreements, a quid pro quo element was
lacking because the union had received nothing in return for agreeing to it. See id. at 616.
221. 675 F. Supp. 960,964-65 (D.N.J. 1987).
222. The players maintained that it was a violation of the antitrust laws for the NBA to
enforce its college draft procedure, salary cap, and "right of first refusal." See id. at 961-
62.
223. See id. at 963.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 961.
226. Id. at 965.
227. The court cited Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Connell, as well as Mackey, in support
of this "balancing" approach. Id
228. See id. at 965-66.
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"impasse" as the point when the exemption expired. "9 The court
noted, however, that the employer should not be able to enjoy the
exemption "indefinitely" simply because it maintained the status quo
under the expired agreement.m
The Bridgeman court ultimately settled on a test for expiration
of the exemption that drew on the employer's subjective intent.3
Under this test, the exemption survived as long as the employer con-
tinued to maintain the status quo and "reasonably believ[ed] that the
practice or a close variant of it [would] be incorporated in the next
collective bargaining agreement." 2  The court noted that utilizing
this test meant that "[i]n any particular case, the exemption may ex-
pire before, during, or after impasse.'m
Yet another test regarding the scope of the exemption emerged
in relation to an expired agreement in Powell v. National Football
League.2 After a district court ruling that the League's antitrust ex-
emption had expired at impasse, the Eighth Circuit reversed, stated
that Mackey was not controlling, but nevertheless purported to apply
the "analytic framework" of Mackey.2 The court found that the
"impasse standard treats a lawful stage of the collective bargaining
process as misconduct," in conflict with labor policy favoring NLRB-
supervised resolution of employment disputes.23 Furthermore, the
229. See id. at 966-67.
230. See id at 966; see also infra notes 292-97 and accompanying text (discussing the
problems presented by an indefinite exemption).
231. See Bridgem an, 675 F. Supp. at 967.
232. Id
233. Id. For one criticism of the Bridgeman test, see Lock, supra note 14, at 370-72.
234. 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989). Like Bridgeman, Powell dealt with players' objec-
tions to a "right of first refusal" provision that had been in effect in previous agreements
that were now expired. See id at 1295-96. The League continued to enforce the provi-
sion in the absence of a new collective bargaining agreement. See id.
235. See id. at 1295.
236. See id at 1298. Chief Judge Lay, who had written the Mackey opinion 13 years
earlier, but was not on the panel that decided Powell, wrote an opinion dissenting from
the court's denial of a rehearing en banc. See id. at 1307 (Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc). In his dissent, the Chief Judge argued that the court in fact had not
applied Mackey but instead had "reject[ed] it by destroying its carefully constructed limi-
tations." Id. at 1308 (Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). He
forcefully argued that the logic of Mackey would not allow extending the exemption past
impasse, because the "bona fide bargaining process" has ended by that time. Id at 1308-
09 (Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The court responded to Chief
Judge Lay's dissent: "We believe [Mackey's] language referring to the 'agreement sought
to be exempted' applies to the 'product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining' before ter-
mination and continues afterward, whether to impasse or to some other point in time."
Id. at 1298 n.6 (citations omitted).
237. Id at 1302 (footnote omitted).
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court noted that labor law provided ample remedies to both employ-
ers and employees after their bargaining had reached impasse."
Thus, the Powell court reasoned that courts should not allow the in-
tervention of antitrust law into disputes when" 'the union has had a
sufficient impact in shaping the content of the employer's offers.' ,,"39
The courts were not the only ones in disagreement over the
scope of the exemption. Commentators offered a variety of views as
to the interplay of antitrust and labor policy with equal disharmony.
As with the courts, the commentators' views ranged from cutting off
the exemption at the expiration of the agreement to effectively
prohibiting antitrust claims in labor settings.24' In an influential 1971
article,242 two commentators argued that antitrust law should be inap-
plicable when a collective bargaining system is in place 3  The
238. See id.
239. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF SPORTS § 5.06, at 590 (1979)).
240. See Lock, supra note 14, at 400; Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union
Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874,888-92 (1991).
241. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 64, at 21; Roberts, supra note 170, at 62-63.
242. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 64. The article has been cited both in court
opinions and scholarly articles. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303; Roberts, supra note 170, at
89; John C. Weistart, Judicial Review of Labor Agreements: Lessons from the'Sports In-
dustry, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113 (Autumn 1981). In his dissent in Brown,
Justice Stevens referred to it as "[t]he article that first advanced the expansive view of the
nonstatutory labor exemption that the Court appears now to endorse." Brown, 116 S. Ct.
at 2133 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 64, at 21. One focal point of the article was the
then-pending Supreme Court case wherein baseball player Curt Flood was suing Major
League Baseball. See id at 1-14. Flood argued that baseball's "reserve clause," which
essentially made a player the "permanent property" of the team that drafted him, vio-
lated the Sherman Act. Id. at 2. The article's position was that because Flood was part of
a union engaged in collective bargaining, he could not, as he wanted to, "exercise his indi-
vidual bargaining power." Il at 7.
Flood lost his case against Major League Baseball. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
284-85 (1972). Interestingly, former Justice Goldberg represented Flood and argued that
baseball's reserve clause should not be protected from antitrust scrutiny by the
"nonstatutory labor exemption." See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972) (No. 71-32), cited in Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2133-34 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
Incidentally, a primary reason for Flood's loss may have been the anomalous exemp-
tion from antitrust law that baseball enjoys. See FREEDMAN, supra note 213, at 31-34. In
a 1922 case, the Supreme Court held that baseball was a local activity, as opposed to in-
terstate commerce, and thus was beyond the reach of a federal law like the Sherman Act.
See Federal Baseball Club v. National League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,208-
09 (1922). The Court has since refused to overturn this decision, based primarily on stare
decisis and the idea that there has been considerable reliance on its 1922 decision. See
FREEDMAN, supra note 213, at 35. The Flood Court made it clear that baseball alone
enjoys the exemption. See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. Even before Flood, the Supreme Court
had refused to extend baseball's exemption to professional football. See Radovich v.
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authors noted that "[c]ollective bargaining seeks to order labor mar-
kets through a system of countervailing power.... If such a structure
was to be protected by law, then logically the antitrust claims be-
tween employers and employees must be extinguished."' Others,
echoing this opinion, maintained that "the nonstatutory exemption
should apply to all matters affecting only the employment relation-
ship.
245
Another position advanced by commentators was that adopted
by the Powell court-that the exemption should survive beyond im-
passe if the employees had some input in "shaping" the restraint that
was eventually imposed.m Other commentators argued that only the
terms that were eventually imposed were "offered to" the union prior
to impasse247 One commentator proposed that the "exemption
should apply until impasse, but not beyond, [regardless of] whether
the challenged restraint remains unmodified, unless either (1) no
party seeks to discuss the expired restraint, or (2) the union chal-
lenges a 'parallel' agreement among members of a multi-employer
bargaining group. '248 Another commentator propounded a simpler
approach, arguing for an extension of the exemption for as long as
the status quo under the expired agreement is maintained, but re-
voking the exemption if employers unilaterally impose new or
different terms. 9 Still another countered that "the employer should
not be able to hide behind a labor law principle requiring it to main-
tain the status quo," and argued that the exemption should expire
when the employees no longer consent to the restraint being imposed
upon them."'
Thus, the Brown Court undertook two interrelated tasks-first,
to define the disputed scope of the nonstatutory exemption that it
NFL, 352 U.S. 445,447-48 (1957).
244. Jacobs & Winter, supra note 64, at 22.
245. Roberts, supra note 170, at 89.
246. WEISTART& LOWELL, supra note 239, at 588-90.
247. Berry & Gould, supra note 207, at 774-75.
248. Goldman, supra note 170, at 671. A "parallel agreement" is an "identity of action
or terms ... among members of a multi-employer bargaining group, as opposed to a joint-
employer restraint, such as a sports player draft, that could not be implemented by an
individual employer." Id. at 664.
249. See Michael S. Hobel, Note, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expi-
ration of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164,
172 (1982).
250. Lock, supra note 14, at 376.
251. See id.; see also Note, supra note 240, at 888 ("It seems logical ... that if union
consent attaches when the union enters a collective bargaining agreement, it should ex-
pire when the agreement expires.").
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had created in its previous cases and second, to declare the degree of
involvement "antitrust courts" should have in areas covered by labor
law. The Court settled the scope controversy by broadly extending
coverage beyond impasse and allowing it to encompass the unilateral
imposition of terms by employers. 2 By defining the scope expan-
sively, the second task solved itself; the new unavailability of the
antitrust suit in labor disputes means that courts are effectively disso-
ciated from the field of collective bargaining, leaving appeals to the
NLRB as the nearly exclusive recourse for disgruntled parties in col-
lective bargaining relationships. 3
Although the Court implied that it was simply clarifying the
scope of the exemption,2 it appears to have broadened it considera-
bly. The Court's language in Connell-that the exemption applied to
"some union-employer agreements"5---lends support to the conclu-
sion that it did not extend to post-agreement bargaining. 6 Or, if one
subscribes to the idea that the exemption was intended to endure for
some time after expiration of the agreement in order to immunize the
parties' actions while they attempted to reach a new agreement, it
would not be illogical to assume that it expires once those parties'
negotiations reached impasse. If the Court's prior decisions sup-
252. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
254. The Court cited Connell, Jewel Tea, and Pennington as support for the existence
of the nonstatutory exemption. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120. However, it did not quote
its previous language from Connell declaring the exemption to apply to "some union-
employer agreements." Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No.
100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975). Rather, the Court insinuated that the exemption had al-
ways been broader in scope than those words suggest and stated that previous decisions
had found that the exemption "applies where needed to make the collective bargaining
process work." Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2119. In another part of the opinion, the Court re-
ferred to the exemption as immunizing "some restraints on competition imposed through
the bargaining process." Id at 2120.
255. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622; see also supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text
(discussing Connell).
256. Cf. Note, supra note 240, at 888 (arguing that a union consents to restraints in an
agreement only for the duration of that agreement, and thus those restraints should lose
their antitrust immunity once the agreement expires). In Brown, the players argued that
the exemption applies only to agreements. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123. The Court
rejected this argument, stating that the "agreement" language had been used previously
simply because Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell had dealt with situations where there
were agreements at issue. See id. Thus, the language reflected only the particular factual
situations to which the exemption was being applied and did "not reflect the exemption's
rationale." Id (emphasis added); cf Roberts, supra note 170, at 79-80 (arguing that al-
though the Court spoke of "agreements" in Jewel Tea, "nothing in the opinion suggests
that the Court intended to limit the exemption exclusively to conduct authorized by
agreements").
257. See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1309 (8th Cir. 1989)
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ported a broad interpretation of the exemption, which permitted ex-
tension beyond impasse and covered the unilateral imposition of new
or different terms by employers, this was not clear to the lower
courts.28
The Court did, however, have support for the general idea un-
derlying its decision in Brown. 9  As discussed above, some
commentators spoke of the general inappropriateness of antitrust law
in labor relations and of how the initiation of an antitrust suit should
not be an option for disgruntled parties in a labor dispute.?° Propo-
nents of this position argue that judicial interference via antitrust law
is essentially a hindrance to the bargaining process.61 Not only are
judges and juries deciding complicated matters in areas of the law in
(Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) ("If the exemption does not end
at impasse, when does it end?"); see also Lock, supra note 14, at 394-95 (stating that even
though labor law allows employers to unilaterally implement terms after impasse, "it is
unlikely that a court would conclude that the labor exemption continues [after impasse
and] even after the status quo has been altered").
258. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)
(requiring an agreement that "is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining" in
order for the exemption to apply); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp.
960, 967 (D.N.J. 1987) (requiring, inter alia, that the employer maintain the status quo in
order for the exemption to apply); Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C.
1976) ("[Ijn any event, it seems apparent that the policy of the exemption ... does not
require and would not be served by extending the exemption to arrangements imposed
unilaterally by employers."), affd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(concluding that no labor exemption to the antitrust laws can be extended to protect the
activities of the employer); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 86 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (stating that nonstatutory exemption did not immunize restraint in agreement
because the restraint had "not been contractually accepted [by the players] as the result
of collective bargaining"); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 485, 498-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (suggesting nonstatutory ex-
emption does not apply when employer has initiated the restraint and there was no
"arm's-length collective bargaining" in regard to it before its inclusion in an agreement);
Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 267-68 (D. Mass. 1972)
(holding exemption did not apply because disputed clause, although embodied in the
agreement, was not "the product of collective bargaining negotiations"). The pre-Connell
cases inferred the existence of the exemption from Jewel Tea, where it had been applied
but not expressly named. See, e.g., Kapp, 390 F. Supp. at 89 (noting that the League cited
Jewel Tea, among others, in support of its contention that employer-employee agreements
are immune from antitrust liability).
259. Among this support is Justice Goldberg's separate opinion in Jewel Tea. See Lo-
cal 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965) (separate
opinion of Goldberg, J.); supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text. As noted, that sepa-
rate opinion was a denunciation of the Court's reasoning in both Jewel Tea and
Pennington. See infra notes 322-30 and accompanying text.
260. See Jacobs & Winter, supra note 64, at 21-22; Roberts, supra note 170, at 86-88.
261. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 170, at 97 ("The nonstatutory exemption is intended
to ensure that parties to the bargaining relationship resolve their differences at the bar-
gaining table, not in the courts.").
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which they have no expertise or perhaps even competence,' 2 but the
availability of the antitrust avenue to labor removes the employees'
incentive to stay at the bargaining table and make a concerted effort
to reach agreement.2 The collective bargaining system, it is argued,
should force both parties to stay at the table until agreement is
reached.' If one side has recourse to the courts via antitrust law, this
recourse effectively works to sabotage the system and bring instabil-
ity to a process that would theoretically stabilize if left free from
interference.'
The clear goal of the Court's decision in Brown was to promote
the unhindered operation of the collective bargaining process.
Keeping the "antitrust courts" out of the labor arena by exempting
virtually the entire bargaining process was meant to encourage col-
lective bargaining agreements, presumably by removing labor unions'
fallback position of bringing antitrust claims.266 The Court's attempt
to promote collective bargaining, however, raises the question of
whether collective bargaining will in fact be encouraged if employers
can unilaterally impose new or different terms after impasse with
immunity from the antitrust laws via a broad nonstatutory exemp-
tion.
Brown may not achieve this goal because employers, without
fear of antitrust sanctions, may now implement any new or different
term after impasse, provided that the term has been "reasonably
comprehended" 267 in the employers' pre-impasse proposal. 6 In this
262. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 716 (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.).
263. See Roberts, supra note 170, at 97.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 83, 96-98.
266. By disallowing antitrust allegations in the courts, all complaints arising out of
collective bargaining must be routed to the NLRB. While the NLRB was created to hear
such complaints, the dissenting panel judge in Powell questioned its effectiveness:
The majority asserts that the players can seek a cease and desist order from the
NLRB to prohibit conduct constituting an unfair labor practice. Implicit in this
assumption is the idea that it may be an unfair labor practice for employers to
insist on a package of player restraints which violate the antitrust laws. The
problem is that the NLRB will not decide that question. The NLRB will say that
it is for the courts to decide whether the antitrust laws are being violated.
Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1305 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dis-
senting).
One commentator suggests that the NFL is unfazed by reprimands from the NLRB,
quoting one League official as saying that" 'I'm never surprised when the NLRB rules in
favor of the union. You know what the penalty is, don't you? They tell you not to do it
again.'" Lock, supra note 14, at 384-85 (quoting NLRB Tackles the Cowboys, USA
TODAY, Mar. 16, 1988, at C3 (statement of Tex Schramm)).
267. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
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way, employers could propose a term favorable to themselves and
not relent, because they would know that upon impasse they would
be free to impose the term unilaterally."9 As such, impasse would be
"more likely and successful collective bargaining less likely."'
The Court's response to such an argument presumably would be
that employers are not free to propose any terms; rather, their pro-
posals must be made in good faith.f1 A bad-faith proposal would be
prohibited as an unfair labor practice.'m However, "it will often be
difficult to distinguish bad faith from mere good-faith 'adamant insis-
tence' on favorable terms," which is allowed.m Thus, employers may
escape sanctions under labor law, and antitrust law will be inapplica-
ble when the employers eventually impose their proposed terms.
This could lead to employers actually favoring impasse over a new
agreement2 4
Even if employers do not engage in bad-faith bargaining, they
are apparently in a better position now to engage in "hard bargain-
ing"-that is, "hang[ing] tough on their demands"' 5 and being less
willing to make concessions in the interest of reaching agreement."
268. See Corcoran, supra note 195, at 1068. The author writes that if the exemption
extends beyond impasse and covers the unilateral imposition of terms, "the employer has
an incentive to generate and maintain impasse. The incentive is produced by the em-
ployer's knowledge that, during impasse, it can enjoy immunity from antitrust liability
while unilaterally imposing new player restraints." Id.
269. Such a tactic may be referred to as "surface bargaining," which is defined as
"going through the motions of negotiating." K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704, 706
(9th Cir. 1980); see also Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1401, 1413 (1958) (discussing the impact on unions of "going through the motions of
negotiating").
270. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dis-
senting), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996); see also Daniel C. Nester, Comment, Labor
Exemption to Antitrust Scrutiny in Professional Sports, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 123, 137 (1990)
(maintaining that under such a system "employers have a strong incentive to generate
impasse").
271. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121. Another response that the Court would presuma-
bly make is that unions are still free to strike. For a discussion of the strike as an
economic weapon, see infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
272. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
273. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1064 n.6 (Wald, J., dissenting).
274. See Goldman, supra note 170, at 658 (noting that employers would have "carte
blanche to impose additional restraints with impunity, merely by bargaining to the point
of impasse on the new restraint"); Corcoran, supra note 195, at 1068; see also Powell v.
National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1309 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, C.J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that such a system "does not accommodate labor
policy, [but] instead offers an employer's Shangri-la of everlasting immunity from the
antitrust laws").
275. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1064 (Wald, J., dissenting).
276. For a discussion of the impact of Brown upon the "balance of powers" between
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One judge contends that the position adopted in Brown "does not
just protect hard bargaining; it positively encourages it. '  Again, this
would have the effect of generating fewer, rather than more, collec-
tive bargaining agreements with which both parties are satisfied.
Also, in taking away a union's ability to bring an antitrust suit,
the Brown decision effectively leaves the strike as the employees'
only economic weapon in the bargaining process. While courts that
espouse the position adopted by Brown concede this' it is a conse-
quence with questionable benefits. First, a strike should be the
proverbial "last step," because it is a drastic move which creates
hardships on both sides of the bargaining table. Unlike an antitrust
suit, a strike burdens the public by depriving it of a product or service
which it ordinarily enjoys.' Yet if the strike is the union's only
weapon, the union will be forced to use it, perhaps regularly.
Second, in regard to professional sports, and particularly to pro-
fessional football, it has been suggested that the players may not have
the ability to effectively strike.m One commentator argues that many
players have short careers, and strikes "jeopardize a disproportionate
percentage of [their] earning potential. ''r 1 If this contention is cor-
rect, the players essentially are left without a bargaining weapon at
all,2 and consequently bring little leverage to the bargaining table.'
Again, the suggestion is that this will have a detrimental, rather than
a beneficial, effect on the collective bargaining system.
Another possible concern is that the position adopted in Brown
either will discourage employees from organizing initially or will en-
courage existing unions to decertify themselves.' It is the status of
employers and employees, see infra notes 349-58 and accompanying text.
277. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1064 (Wald, J., dissenting). But see Jacobs & Winter, supra
note 64, at 27 (implying that it is not the role of antitrust law to check hard bargaining by
employers).
278. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302.
279. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (stating that strikes "impair the interest of the public
in the free flow of... commerce").
280. See Lock, supra note 14, at 385,403-04.
281. Mid at 403. The author further argues that because players have nowhere else to
sell their services, the League is in a better position than the players to endure a strike.
See id. This is especially true because the NFL appears to suffer no long-term detrimental
effects of consumer ill-will after strikes. See id. at 403-04. But cf. Mike Weber, Fans'
Group Warns of Rising Wrath, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Sept. 10, 1995 (discussing
adverse impact of 1994 baseball strike on revenues).
282. See infra notes 349-58 and accompanying text.
283. See Lock, supra note 14, at 403.
284. See Goldman, supra note 170, at 658. Decertification of a union entails having
union members sign a petition authorizing the decertification and the subsequent presen-
tation of the petition to the NLRB. See Nester, supra note 270, at 138 & n.11.
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the employees as a certified union that places them within the collec-
tive bargaining system.2 Under Brown, it is the collective bargaining
system that essentially removes the availability of an antitrust suit.
Thus, employees may prefer not to be organized in a group so that
they can regain the ability to threaten antitrust action.' If the system
under Brown encourages labor groups to disband, it undermines the
national labor policy favoring collective bargaining.
One commentator argues that a system which allows employers
to unilaterally impose terms after impasse "sacrifices both labor and
antitrust interests." He explains that under such a system, decerti-
fication would be a "realistic response."' This would mean that
"[e]ither employees would be left with no representation, or informal
'blackout' negotiations may take place. The latter forfeits labor law
protections and the former completely undermines collective bar-
gaining. "
One of the dissents in Powell criticized a rule allowing unilateral
imposition of terms after impasse and stated that a union should not
have to decertify "in order to invoke rights to which the players are
clearly entitled under the antitrust laws... . Union decertification is
hardly a worthy goal to pursue in balancing labor policy with the anti-
trust laws." Although the possibility of such decertification may
seem slight, the Players Association temporarily decertified its union
"Decertification places the parties to the collective bargaining negotiations at the status
quo ante. The situation is the equivalent to having no union at all." ld. at 138 n.11. Be-
cause there is no collective bargaining relationship, the employers' restraints are no
longer immunized from antitrust law. See id.
285. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158-59 (1994).
286. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J.,
dissenting), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). If the collective bargaining system allows em-
ployers to unilaterally impose terms after impasse, then "[e]mployees in a weak
bargaining position will likely opt in favor of clinging to antitrust protection as the less
risky course of action; these employees will henceforth have powerful incentives not to
engage in collective bargaining at all." Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
287. Goldman, supra note 170, at 659. Antitrust interests would be sacrificed due to
the nature of the restraints-to which the union never agreed-that such a system would
allow employers to impose on unions after impasse. See id. at 658.
288. 1&i at 658.
289. IE at 658-59 (footnote omitted). The author defines a" 'blackout' agreement" as
"an agreement to bargain without official recognition of the meetings." Id. at 658 n.218.
See generally Jeffrey D. Schneider, Note, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: The Lack of Free
Agency in the NFL, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 797, 846-49 (1991) (arguing that decertification
would have harmful consequences for the group of players as a whole, such as the loss of
protections and benefits for non-superstar players and increased transaction costs in sepa-
rately negotiating every term in each individual player's contract).
290. Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1309-10 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay,
C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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and discontinued negotiations with the NFL after the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Powell.291
The other dissenting opinion in Powell took issue with the rule
prohibiting a union, either indefinitely or permanently, from bringing
an antitrust suit against an employer for continuing to enforce a re-
straint in an expired agreement.2 2 A similar argument is that such a
standard, where the exemption extends beyond impasse, creates a
"lifetime exemption" for employers.293 That is, once employees have
agreed to a certain restraint in a collective bargaining agreement,
employers can continue to enforce the restraint beyond expiration of
that agreement and beyond the time when the parties subsequently
bargain to impasse over the disputed term, without fear of antitrust
sanctions.
Some argue that permitting this lifetime exemption is unwise for
several reasons. First, newly formed unions, which are often rela-
tively weak, may agree to restraints in an initial agreement to which
they would not be willing to agree in subsequent agreements when
they become stronger.294 An employer enjoying a lifetime exemption
could continue to impose the restraints from the initial agreement
after it expires, even though the union at that time would have suffi-
cient bargaining power to resist the restraint if it were embodied in a
new proposal.295 Second, in accepting the restraint in the previous
agreement, the employees presumably received something in return
291. See Corcoran, supra note 195, at 1064. After decertification, individual players
brought several antitrust suits. See White v. National Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389
(D. Minn. 1993); Jackson v. National Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992);
Powell v. National Football League, 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991). Ultimately, a
Minnesota district court judge pressured the League and the players to enter into a new
collective bargaining agreement. See Corcoran, supra note 195, at 1064-65.
One commentator has written that a union, if faced with unilateral imposition of re-
straints, could decertify, sue under antitrust laws, and then reunionize in order to regain
the advantages of the labor laws. See Note, supra note 240, at 883. If the employers again
tried to impose unilateral restraints, "the whole process may repeat." Id This "surely
does not accommodate the national labor policy intended to secure economic stability."
Id.
292. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1307 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
293. Goldman, supra note 170, at 666.
294. See id.; see also Lock, supra note 14, at 350 (suggesting that players had success in
earlier antitrust suits such as Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir.
1976), because the courts recognized that the restraints had been imposed when the union
was newly-formed and relatively weak); cf Weistart, supra note 242, at 129 (arguing that
consent to a restraint in an agreement should be presumed when parties have an estab-
lished bargaining relationship, but that restraints in agreements from newly formed
bargaining relationships should receive closer antitrust scrutiny).
295. See Goldman, supra note 170, at 666-67.
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that they valued equally.296 If the union becomes stronger and no
longer values as highly what it received in return for agreeing to the
restraint, it would be "inequitable" to allow the employer to continue
to apply the restraint.'z
The Court in Brown implicitly denied that it was granting the
equivalent of a lifetime exemption because employers would not nec-
essarily be exempt from antitrust law if their actions were
"sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collective-
bargaining process." 298 However, the Court declined to "draw the
line"m where employers' actions may lose their exemption, leaving
that line somewhere beyond impasse and beyond the unilateral impo-
sition of terms by employers. 0 As such, the system that Brown
established may suffer many of the same drawbacks discussed in re-
gard to a true lifetime exemption. Further, the above critique of the
lifetime exemption focused on the situation in which employers con-
tinued to enforce a term that at one time had been a part of an
agreement. That is, it contemplated a situation in which employees
agree to a restraint which the employers continue to enforce after the
agreement expires. Brown presented a still more controversial situa-
tion-the unilateral imposition of a restraint to which the union never
previously agreed.3'
The Court did offer justifications for allowing employers to uni-
laterally impose terms-even new or different ones-after impasse.
The Court noted that labor law allows employers to impose new or
different terms after impasse, provided those terms were "reasonably
296. See id.
297. Id. This is effectively an issue of "quid pro quo." See infra notes 315-19 and ac-
companying text; see also Lock, supra note 14, at 392-94 (arguing that even the status quo
doctrine-under which an employer remains exempt from antitrust liability so long as the
employer retains the terms of the expired agreement--"gives management a benefit for
which there was no bargained-for exchange").
29& Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127; see supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
299. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
300. See id. ("We need not decide in this case whether, or where, ... to draw [the]
line.").
301. See id. at 2119; id. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Brown Court's ruling
goes beyond other decisions that had bestowed a liberal scope on the exemption. For
example, the Eighth Circuit in Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.
1989), fashioned a broad exemption, see supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text, but it
was addressing a situation in which the "restraints imposed by management [were] de-
rived from an expired collective bargaining agreement." Powell, 930 F.2d at 1301
(emphasis added). Similarly, in National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d
Cir. 1995), the court held that the employers' actions were exempt because they were
merely continuing to enforce terms that had been in a previous agreement that had since
expired. See id. at 688.
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comprehended" in prior proposals and were made in good faith.
From this it concluded that impasse and the subsequent unilateral
imposition of terms "constitute an integral part of the bargaining
process."' Because it was the expansive bargaining "process" that
the Court sought to protect with the exemption, these "stages" of the
process had to be included.
However, while post-impasse unilateral imposition of terms had
been accepted in labor law, the Court had not previously held that
this imposition of terms was likewise exempt from antitrust laws.
Indeed, it is possible that the threat of antitrust law functioned as a
check against employers who would attempt to impose post-impasse
terms unilaterally 5 That is, although the NLRB allowed these em-
ployers to impose new or different terms unilaterally, the fear of
antitrust sanctions made them prefer to reach agreement or, if
agreement could not be reached, made them cautious in applying op-
pressive terms.3
Also, it is arguable whether impasse and the subsequent unilat-
eral imposition of terms constitute part of the "bargaining process."
By conventional definition, "impasse" denotes the final termination
of a bargaining process.' The Court explained, however, that labor
law's definition of "impasse" describes what is often a "temporary"
situation." As far as labor law is concerned, "impasse" is " 'a recur-
302. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2121.
303. I&
304. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 50
F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996); see also Nester, supra note 270, at
143 (arguing that while post-impasse unilateral imposition of terms is allowed by labor
law, the practice "should not receive immunity from the federal antitrust laws [because
the] implementations have received no bargained-for exchange, they were not mandated
by labor law policy, and [they] have no implied union consent" (footnotes omitted)). But
cf. Roberts, supra note 170, at 96 (arguing that the view that antitrust law should apply to
actions that labor law allows is "extraordinary" and "based on the erroneous assumption
that union consent is required to exempt a restraint").
305. Cf Goldman, supra note 170, at 661 (discussing how judicial involvement via the
application of antitrust law affects the balance of power at the bargaining table). The
author states that if the exemption is not clearly defined, then "labor and management
bargain knowing that judicial intervention may be possible if employers impose intoler-
able labor market restraints." Id
306. Cf Lock, supra note 14, at 374 (arguing that an employer has an incentive to bar-
gain to an agreement because that is the only way to immunize an otherwise-illegal
restraint from antitrust law).
307. One dictionary defines "impasse" as "a blind alley; an impassable road; by exten-
sion, a situation that has no solution or affords no escape." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH
CENTURY DICIIONARY 911 (2d ed. 1983).
308. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2124; see also Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n,
675 F. Supp. 960, 966 (D.N.J. 1987) (stating that "impasse is not equivalent to the end of
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ring feature in the bargaining process ... a temporary deadlock or
hiatus in negotiations which in almost all cases is eventually broken,
through either a change of mind or the application of economic
force.' "3 Yet even if one accepts that impasse is part of the bar-
gaining process, 30 it is more difficult to accept the notion that one
party's unilateral imposition of new or different terms over the objec-
tion of the other party constitutes "bargaining" toward an agreement.
As one judge stated, "[u]nilateraly-imposed terms are a substitute for
an agreement, not a means of reaching one.,
311
Professor Goldman argues that for antitrust purposes, "union-
employer agreements [should be treated] differently from restraints
imposed unilaterally by employer[s]. 312 The reason for this is that
stability in the collective bargaining system can be reached only
through agreements, and "[u]nilateral imposition of terms can breed
resentment that may explode at any time."3  As such, the unilateral
imposition of terms after impasse should not be seen as part of a bar-
gaining "process" that is completely exempt from antitrust
negotiations").
309. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v.
NLRB, 454 U.S. 404,412 (1982)). The definition that the Court adopted in Bonanno was
promulgated by the NLRB. See Bonanno, 454 U.S. at 412 (citing Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc., 243 N.L.R.B. 1093, 1093-94 (1979), aff'd, 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980),
affd, 454 U.S. 404 (1982)). Justice O'Connor, dissenting from Bonanno, argued that the
NLRB's application of the "impasse" label may not be appropriate in all situations in
which the parties cannot reach agreement: "The problem with the Board's approach is
that it reasons by definition. That is, while an impasse may be a temporary deadlock, a
deadlock cannot be made temporary simply by calling it an impasse." Bonanno, 454 U.S.
at 428 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
310. This interpretation is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Powell v. National Foot-
ball League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1309 (8th Cir. 1989) (Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) ("Once impasse has been reached, after termination of an agreement,
it is a complete nonsequitur to hold that continued restraints are protected as an accom-
modation of the good faith bargaining of the parties.").
Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, wrote a dissenting opinion in Bonanno in
which he argued that "impasse" should have a connotation of more permanence: One
should not "ignore[] a basic element of impasse: impasse is reached only when a stale-
mate-a breakdown in bargaining-occurs after good-faith negotiations. Intentionally
refusing to agree in order to create an impasse ... is hardly good-faith bargaining." Bo-
nanno, 454 U.S. at 426-27 (Burger, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
311. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dis-
senting), affjd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996); see also Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967 (stating that
"[w]hen the employer no longer has [a reasonable belief that the restraint being imposed
will be included in the next agreement], it is then unilaterally imposing the restriction on
its employees, and the restraint can no longer be deemed the product of arm's-length
negotiation").
312. Goldman, supra note 170, at 659.
313. Id.
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repercussions."
Further, the unilateral imposition of terms would seem not to be
part of the bargaining process because it lacks the elements of con-
sent and a quid pro quo relationship. Under this theory, a union
will consent to a certain restraint because it receives something it
values in return.16 Thus, although there is a restraint, labor policy
immunizes it from antitrust law.317 However, when a restraint is uni-
laterally imposed, the union no longer consents; it is not receiving
something of equal value in return for enduring the restraint. 8 Thus,
the governing conditions are not the result of bargaining and should
not be exempt from the antitrust laws.319
However, the majority in Brown found the "consent" argument
unpersuasive. It noted that "consent" could not apply solely to the
agreement, because it was already settled that the exemption applied
to the bargaining process and not merely to the agreement itself.3m
As for post-agreement bargaining, the Court held that the consent
principle could not apply in that context either because there were
314. See IL
315. See id. at 671-72. But cf. Roberts, supra note 170, at 94-95 (arguing that it is im-
practicable or impossible to establish criteria for determining what is "adequate union
consent").
316. See Goldman, supra note 170, at 671-72.
317. See id.
318. Presumably, if the union felt that it was still receiving something of value in re-
turn for agreeing to the restraint, impasse would have never been reached and the term
would not have been unilaterally imposed. In arguing that the exemption should expire at
impasse, one commentator states that it is proper to allow the exemption to endure past
expiration of the agreement because it is reasonable to assume that terms to which a un-
ion has agreed in the past will be acceptable to them in a future agreement. See Nester,
supra note 270, at 138. However, "[t]his assumption of union consent is undermined
when impasse exists because impasse implies the union does not want the terms in the
next agreement." IL The author further argues that "when unilateral changes have been
implemented, no reasonable basis exists for assuming the union will incorporate these
new terms into the next agreement because it has never previously cousented to such
terms." Id
319. See Goldman, supra note 170, at 672. The dissenting judge in Powell asserted that
"[t]he labor exemption will not immunize restraints which are unilaterally continued after
impasse because such restraints are not agreed to during good faith bargaining. Similarly,
new restraints, unilaterally implemented, are not protected by the labor exemption. Un-
ion approval is a prerequisite [for] ... the exemption." Powell v. National Football
League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1305 (8th Cir. 1989) (Heaney, J., dissenting). The court in
Bridgeman maintained that the exemption protects the products of bargaining and
"guards against unilateral imposition of terms as to which there is no agreement."
Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D.N.J. 1987) (emphasis
added). See generally Note, supra note 240, at 888-94 (discussing the need for consent to
support the exemption).
320. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
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many things that a union would not and should not consent to-such
as a certain bargaining position adopted by employers, or a lockout-
that were nevertheless legitimate actions that employers are free to
take.321
The Court similarly dismissed related arguments in creating
what Justice Stevens referred to as "a newly-minted exemption [that
is crafted] only by ignoring the reasoning of one of our prior deci-
sions in favor of the views of the dissenting Justice in that case."
' 'm
The prior decision to which Justice Stevens referred was Penning-
ton,' and the "dissenting Justice" in that case was Justice
Goldberg.'u Justice Stevens' charge has merit? The Brown Court
arguably abandoned the principles of-or at least the philosophy be-
hind-the Pennington-Jewel Tea-Connell line of cases. Those three
cases reflected a Court that was quite willing to intervene in labor
issues and apply antitrust law,32' despite the protestations of Justice
Goldberg urging the "antitrust courts" to stay out of such issues."z In
Brown, it was the Court itself that decried the intervention of
"antitrust courts" in labor relations" in the process of creating an
antitrust exemption broad enough to insulate the courts from hearing
321. See id. at 2123-24. The Court's logic is not wholly convincing. Unions could very
well consent to enduring unfavorable employer bargaining positions and lockouts as a
price for entering a collective bargaining relationship and working toward an agreement.
Presumably, they would expect the employers to "consent" in the same way to their
striking, even though the employers would obviously not desire a strike. Thus, certain
unpleasantries in the bargaining process can be consented to in the interest of reaching an
agreement. When the bargaining process ends, however-that is, when impasse occurs
and terms are unilaterally imposed-then this is beyond the scope of what the union con-
sented to and could subject the employer to antitrust liability. Cf. Hackbart v. Cincinnati
Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 520-21 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that although a football
player consents to being subject to certain violent acts as a consequence of playing the
game, the consent does not necessarily extend to intentional, illegal blows inflicted by an
opposing player that are outside the scope of the "general customs" of the game).
322. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2131 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
323. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). For a discussion of
Pennington, see supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
324. See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697
(1965) (separate opinion of Goldberg, J.). Justice Goldberg wrote a single separate
opinion regarding both Pennington and Jewel Tea. See id. at 697 (separate opinion of
Goldberg, J.). He concurred in the judgment in Jewel Tea and dissented from the opinion
in Pennington; he disagreed with the reasoning in both cases. See id. (separate opinion of
Goldberg, J.); supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
325. Justice Stevens noted that "[a]t five critical junctures in its opinion" the Court
relied on Justice Goldberg's separate opinion. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
326. See supra notes 160-89 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
328. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2123.
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labor disputes in the guise of antitrust claims.
Although the Court adopted Justice Goldberg's stance 9 over its
previous position, this may well have been justified as a corrective
move. Pennington, Jewel Tea, and Connell may be viewed as a depar-
ture from the correct course, adding nothing but confusion to the
relatively sound framework established by the Apex-Hutcheson-Allen
Bradley trilogy.3 Viewed in this light, the position of Justice Gold-
berg and his two fellow dissenters may have reflected the better
viewpoint. Thus, the Brown Court used Justice Goldberg's separate
opinion in Jewel Tea and Pennington as a connecting bridge across
the Court's arguably erroneous position of the 1960s and 1970s in or-
der to retrieve and re-adopt the more balanced and less criticized
position it had assumed in the 1950s.
However, while the Brown Court apparently abandoned the
mindset behind the Pennington line of cases, it neither expressly nor
implicitly overruled them. Those cases dealt with situations in which
third-party competitors were affected by an agreement made be-
tween a union and employers.331 In Brown, the Court limited its
holding to cases where "only the parties to the collective-bargaining
relationship" are affected.332 Thus, the courts theoretically are still
open to third parties who allege antitrust injury caused by a labor
agreement between other parties. Brown merely closes the courts to
the disgruntled party in a bargaining relationship who wants to bring
an antitrust suit against the party with whom it is bargaining. Yet, in
329. According to the reasoning of one lower court, Brown goes beyond even Justice
Goldberg's approach insofar as it exempts from antitrust scrutiny terms that were never
contained in an agreement. See Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.D.C.
1976), afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Smith, the district
court stated that "Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Jewel Tea ... makes clear that
his arguments all assume the existence of a collective bargaining agreement, and cannot
be read in any reasonable fashion" to support the argument that mandatory subjects of
bargaining automatically fall within the exemption regardless of whether they are em-
bodied in an agreement. Id (emphasis added).
330. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 110, at 500 (stating that "the trilogy of Pen-
nington, Jewel Tea, and Connell is on a collision course with the developing law on the
scope of the duty to bargain"); Leslie, supra note 1, at 1218 ("Jewel Tea diverged from the
relatively clear line of demarcation [between antitrust immunity and liability] that had
been drawn by prior decisions [in Hutcheson and Apex].").
331. See supra notes 160-89 and accompanying text.
332. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127. In partial support of the Court's position, one com-
mentator has written that "labor contract terms which have purely intra-unit effects
appear to present the most compelling case for foreclosing antitrust review." Weistart,
supra note 242, at 112. This commentator goes on to say, however, that the analysis can-
not stop at that point: "Another critical issue concerns the degree of employee consent
that will be required before the employer can claim the protection of the exemption." Id;
see supra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
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the Court's determination to fashion a broad rule that would une-
quivocally exclude bargaining parties from the courts, it may have
failed to take account of the "special nature" of the case. Justice Ste-
vens asserted in his dissent that there were "three unique features of
the case" which were critical in determining whether the nonstatutory
exemption should apply.'
First, Justice Stevens noted that the policy behind encouraging
labor to organize is to prevent competition between workers and a
consequent depression of wages."' Labor statutes serve to allow
"collective action by union members to achieve wage levels that are
higher than would be available in a free market." '335 In contrast, while
professional football players want their salaries determined by the
free market, the League's resolution mandated paying the players
wages below the market level.3 Second, Justice Stevens noted that
the League's implementation of the resolution was not done as a bar-
gaining tactic, but was merely a means of forcing the team owners to
comply with roster limits.337 As such, the League was "forbidding
players from individually competing in the labor market," primarily
as a result of its refusal to directly confront the team owners and dili-
gently enforce the roster limits.3' Third, Justice Stevens argued that
the League's proposal of the resolution and its subsequent implemen-
tation over the protests of the players could hardly be characterized
as bargaining to impasse; it was more accurately characterized as
"notice to the union" that the League would soon unilaterally im-
plement the resolution. 9
The majority stated that nothing sufficiently distinguished pro-
fessional sports to make the case particularly unique.' As to Justice
333. Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
334. See ad at 2128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
335. Id at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. See id. at 2129-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf Roberts, supra note 170, at 27
(arguing that if one challenges a restraint based on the fact that it limits competition
among players, then "the challenge is necessarily founded on the claim that antitrust law
proscribes restraints on competition for the labor of human beings .... That, however, is
precisely what section 6 [of the Clayton Act] expressly and unambiguously declares to be
outside the ambit of the antitrust laws."). For the relevant text of section 6 of the Clayton
Act, see supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
337. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
338. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
339. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf. Zimmerman v. National Football League, 632 F.
Supp. 398, 408 (D.D.C. 1986) (examining an agreement and noting that "[t]he important
question is whether bona fide bargaining took place such that the policies in favor of such
bargaining should take precedence over antitrust concerns").
340. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126 (noting that professional sports might be "special"
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Stevens' first point about football players' desire to negotiate their
salaries individually, the majority vaguely responded that "this char-
acteristic seems simply a feature, like so many others, that might give
employees (or employers) more (or less) bargaining power, that
might lead some (or all) of them to favor a particular kind of bar-
gaining, or that might lead to certain demands at the bargaining
table."" As to the dissent's second point, the majority noted that it
would require a subjective inquiry into the League's purpose or mo-
tivation, an inquiry which it refused to make.32 Concerning Justice
Stevens' third point, the majority noted that both parties were treat-
ing the case as if an impasse had been reached and thus there was no
basis for contending otherwise. 3 Hence, the majority stated that
there was no reason for "distinguishing football players from other
organized workers. We therefore conclude that all must abide by the
same legal rules."3
If Justice Stevens was correct in his contention that the facts of
Brown made it an atypical case, it may appear that the Court fash-
ioned its.new, broad exemption in spite of this particular case. That
is, in its desire to resolve the controversy over the scope of the ex-
emption and the proper role of the courts in labor disputes, the Court
neglected to properly consider the "case or controversy" before it on
its individual facts. Thus, a larger problem was resolved at the ex-
pense of one class of plaintiffs or perhaps one industry.
An alternative interpretation, however, is that the Court fash-
ioned its broad rule precisely because of the type of case it had before
with regard to interest, excitement, talent, or concern, but not with respect to labor law's
antitrust exemption or the framework within which bargaining is to take place).
341. Id.
342. See iL The Court's refusal to consider motivation is not without support in schol-
arly literature. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 1, at 722 ("Violations that turn on the
existence of particular 'purposes' or 'motives' in collective bargaining confront triers of
fact with slippery evidentiary issues and, as a corollary, place collective bargaining under
a Damoclean sword.").
343. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126 ("Insofar as they suggest that there was not a
genuine impasse, they fight the basic assumption upon which the District Court, the Court
of Appeals, the petitioners, and this Court rest the case.").
344. IL In opposition to this viewpoint, one commentator has written that "[s]everal
factors distinguish the market for professional football from other markets ... . [These
factors] have created an inherently unequal bargaining relationship between players and
owners quite unlike the relationship between industrial employees and employers."
Lock, supra note 14, at 354. The author further argues that the "NLRA was designed for
industrial employees. It was not designed for professional employees with a wide range
of skills, short careers, and seasonal employment." Id- at 418; see also Berry & Gould,
supra note 207, at 706-10 (discussing several ways in which a union of professional ath-
letes differs from ordinary trade unions); Nester, supra note 270, at 128-29 (same).
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it. Antitrust cases involving professional sports are perennially be-
fore the courts; the players and unions of the various professional
sports leagues have brought numerous suits in the last two decades,
each time alleging antitrust violations by team owners and league
management.345 Yet the Brown Court utilized only non-sports cases
in its reasoning; conspicuous by their absence were the many sports
cases that much more closely addressed the precise issue before the
Court and which had been discussed openly in the lower courts' deci-
sions in Brown.3
If the Court was indeed targeting professional sports with its
broad exemption, it may have grave implications for other labor
fields. One commentator has warned that "[i]n their haste to exempt
employers' restraints on labor, particularly in sports markets, com-
mentators would permit the exercise of collective monopsony power
against less powerful or unorganized workers, misallocate resources
to the detriment of public welfare, ... and possibly permit collusion
by service or professional workers."' 7
Regardless of whether the Court aimed the new rule at any par-
ticular industry, the inescapable fact remains that the Court was
forced to make a decision about the scope of the exemption. It seems
equally clear that "no decision concerning the scope of the labor ex-
emption [could] be considered neutral." ' In other words, the
question of when employee unions may bring an antitrust suit, or
345. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995); Powell v.
National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro-Football, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmerman v. National Football
League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp.
525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Kapp v. National Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
346. The absence of reliance on sports cases is puzzling in light of the fact that the
exemption historically has played a different role in sports cases than in non-sports cases.
See supra note 213. One commentator has argued that because the exemption plays a
different role in sports cases, the "proper analysis of the exemption issue in player cases
should be quite different from the narrowly focused analysis of Jewel Tea and Penning-
ton." Roberts, supra note 170, at 62. This would apparently explain the Brown Court's
result, but not necessarily its methodology in reaching that result.
347. Goldman, supra note 170, at 685. Commentators are split as to whether profes-
sional sports should receive special treatment under the antitrust laws. Compare id. at
626 n.36 (arguing that "[tireating sports cases as sui generis" may have detrimental effects
on salary and benefit levels), and Jacobs & Winter, supra note 64, at 9 (arguing that un-
ions of professional athletes should not receive special treatment under antitrust laws),
with Lock, supra note 14, at 409 (suggesting amendment to the National Labor Relations
Act as it applies to professional sports).
348. Goldman, supra note 170, at 661.
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whether they may bring one at all, may well reduce to a question of
balancing bargaining powers between labor and management.
One position is that if the unions do not have the ability to bring
an antitrust suit, "the balance of power dramatically shifts toward
employers.""MS Subscribers to this position argue that the exemption
must be tailored to allow unions to threaten an antitrust suit after the
expiration of agreement3 or after bargaining has reached impasse.51
That is, the employees must have this antitrust weapon in their arse-
nal in order to escape having terms unilaterally imposed on them at
impasse.35"2 In this view, granting the employees such a weapon is the
only way they can match the bargaining power of the stronger em-
ployers and play on a level field."
349. Id
350. See, e.g., Note, supra note 240, at 888 (arguing that employers should no longer be
exempt from antitrust sanctions after the expiration of the agreement).
351. See, e.g., Nester, supra note 270, at 125-26 (arguing for expiration of the exemp-
tion at impasse).
352. See Goldman, supra note 170, at 673. The author notes that "[o]nce the rights of
the parties at impasse are defined, however, the threat of an antitrust suit already should
be a part of the union's arsenal that the parties must incorporate into their bargaining
stance." Id. Goldman argues that subjecting employers to antitrust liability after impasse
would not encourage bad faith bargaining by unions because the union would rather reach
an agreement than initiate a long and expensive lawsuit. See id.
353. See Lock, supra note 14, at 399. Regarding the NFL, the author argues that if the
League's actions after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement are exempt from
antitrust liability, "it will eliminate the one remaining weapon that the [Players Associa-
tion] has at its disposal to counteract the League's ability to dictate and employ
anticompetitive restraints, thereby further emasculating the union's leverage at the bar-
gaining table." Id; see also Corcoran, supra note 195, at 1068 ("The most significant
economic weapon the union can use to break this impasse [and the subsequent imposition
of unfavorable terms] is the antitrust laws.").
The district court in Brown asserted that "[t]he threat of treble damages under the
antitrust laws is one of [the] union's economic weapons in its collective bargaining arse-
nal. Exempting employers from application of the antitrust laws in the absence of a
collective bargaining agreement deprives unions of a statutorily created bargaining chip
in the negotiating process." Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125, 133 (D.D.C.
1991), rev'd, 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). The dissent in
the D.C. Circuit's Brown decision agreed with the district court, noting that "denying
employers antitrust exemption for unilaterally-imposed terms does not place any new
offensive plays in the employees' playbook. Rather, it affords them a defense against
unilateral employer actions that offend antitrust principles." Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,
50 F.3d 1041, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
One commentator, although criticizing the court in Mackey v. National Football
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), for failing to find that the exemption applied, noted
that the decision allowed the union to return to the bargaining table with its "negotiating
leverage substantially enhanced"; subsequently, "impasse was broken, and a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement was reached within a few months." Roberts, supra note 170, at
74; see Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616; supra notes 214-20. However, this commentator disa-
greed with the court's interference in the bargaining process, noting that the benefits it
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The other position is that the field is level only when employees
do not have the weapon of an antitrust suit."' This argument appeals
to, or derives from, the idea that the collective bargaining system is
sealed and self-contained, governed by labor law, and impervious to
the intrusion of antitrust law or other governmental interference. 55
Under this theory, each side's "weapons" are provided solely by la-
bor law: employers may lock out, employees may strike, or either
side may appeal to the NLRB? 6
The Court in Brown embraced the latter view, or at least the re-
sult proposed by such a view. The Court indeed may have recognized
the interest of retaining the employees' ability to bring antitrust suits
as a "balancing" weapon against the greater power of employers."
Nevertheless, this interest lost out in a broader "balancing" test to
the interest of ridding labor law of the difficulties and complexities of
antitrust law. In other words, to maintain that power in employees
meant the continued intervention of courts in labor law, and thus that
power had to be sacrificed to achieve a broader and purportedly
more important objective.5
The Court may have taken too large a step in removing this
threat of antitrust suit and consequently immunizing a wide range of
produced were short-lived because at the expiration of the new agreement "the parties
were again at loggerheads in the courts." Roberts, supra note 170, at 74-75.
354. See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293, 1302 (8th Cir. 1989)
(arguing that to allow players to bring an antitrust suit would "upset the careful balance
established by Congress through the labor law"); Lock, supra note 14, at 383 (noting that
the NFL team owners argue that the availability of an antitrust suit "distorts the bargain-
ing process by artificially inflating the union's bargaining leverage").
355. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487-90 (1960)
(discussing governmental non-interference with collective bargaining and considering
limiting interference to good/bad faith determination); Roberts, supra note 170, at 82-83
(arguing that aside from sanctioning violations of unfair trade practices listed in the
NLRA, "the government may not interfere in the substance of the negotiations or in
writing contract terms").
356. See Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302.
357. After discussing the difficult position employers would suffer at impasse if they
were subject to the antitrust laws, see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text, the Court
conceded that "[w]e do not see any obvious answer to this problem." Brown, 116 S. Ct. at
2123. This suggests that the Court felt there were some legitimate purposes behind al-
lowing unions to bring antitrust suits; otherwise, the answer would have been obvious.
358. Cf. Roberts, supra note 170, at 91 (asserting that there is a "requirement of sub-
stantive noninterference [by courts] in collective bargaining mandated by Norris-
LaGuardia and the NLRA"). But cf Lock, supra note 14, at 386 (arguing that the type of
judicial involvement that the labor statutes seek to prohibit does not necessarily include
determination of rights under the antitrust laws); Meltzer, supra note 1, at 701 ("There is
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that [the purpose of the labor statutes] was to
liberate collective bargaining from restrictions imposed by the Sherman Act.").
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employer activity against antitrust law."9 The express "statutory"
antitrust exemptions apply almost exclusively to unilateral union ac-
tivity."W The judicially created "nonstatutory" exemption, at least as
it was originally defined, appeared to apply only to agreements
reached through the collective bargaining process.36' That these
agreements should be exempt was obvious and noncontroversial, be-
cause they were encouraged by labor policy and required by labor
law.
That the scope of the exemption should be broadened to now in-
lude unilateral activity by employers is not nearly so obvious, and in
fact is highly debatable. One reason is that the labor laws have tradi-
tionally operated to favor employees in an effort to put them on
equal bargaining ground with employers.362 If the courts now effec-
tively remove that advantage by granting employers additional power
in the form of antitrust immunity,3 63 this would seem to run counter to
the congressional intent upon which the Court relied so heavily in
Brown.
359. See, e.g., Weistart, supra note 242, at 146 (arguing that while labor policy favors
limited judicial interference, "blind adherence to [a policy of complete judicial noninter-
vention] would protect wholly unilateral employer action and subvert the goal of the
labor exemption"); Corcoran, supra note 195, at 1074 ("[U]nilaterally imposed restraints
(implemented after impasse) should never receive the shield of exemption.").
360. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421
U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975); Lock, supra note 14, at 351.
361. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
362. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (discussing history of labor statutes and noting that prior decisions found them to
be for the benefit of employees); Lock, supra note 14, at 353 (arguing that the "original
purpose" of the statutory labor exemption was to "protect unions ... from antitrust at-
tack"); Meltzer, supra note 1, at 667 ("[O]ne of the declared objectives of the labor
statutes was the protection of labor organization in order to balance the power of large
business combinations."); Weistart, supra note 242, at 114 ("[T]he ultimate objective of
the [statutory and nonstatutory] labor exemption[s] was the same-the furtherance of
employees' goals through collective action.").
363. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2129 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued
that "[iun light of the accommodation that has been struck between antitrust and labor
law policy, it would be ironic to extend an exemption crafted to protect collective action
by employees to protect employers acting jointly to deny employees the opportunity to
negotiate their salaries individually." Id- (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Roberts, supra
note 170, at 35-45, 96-97 (arguing that "the text and legislative history of the [Clayton
Act] compel the conclusion that [it] applies equally to employer and union conduct").
364. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2120, 2123, 2127. Justice Goldberg, upon whose views
the Brown Court relied for support, also emphasized congressional intent. See Local 189,
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 702-10 (1965) (separate
opinion of Goldberg, J.). One commentator has criticized Justice Goldberg's approach
because its "reliance on that plastic perennial, the intent of Congress, is not even sup-
ported by a single reference to a statutory provision or to the legislative history of the
NLRA, as amended." Meltzer, supra note 1, at 731.
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On the other hand, if it is the intent of Congress to remove the
courts from labor disputes,' " then perhaps the Brown Court saw the
broad construction of this exemption as the only way to make an ef-
fective exit. It may further have been the result of some degree of
frustration, as Congress has not drawn clear lines delineating the
realm of antitrust law and that of labor law. Rather, it has written
statutes in two areas of the law that have relatively large areas of
overlap and which conflict with each other to a significant degree. 6
Offering little if any guidance, Congress has watched the courts
struggle for years over the boundary between labor law and antitrust
law.3 6
7
Perhaps feeling left in the crossfire, the Court may simply have
determined that if Congress would not draw the line between the two
areas of the law, then the Court would do so itself. The most effec-
tive way to do this was to throw a broad blanket of antitrust
immunity over virtually everything relating to the labor field.
Viewed in this way, increasing the power of employers was merely a
by-product of a larger policy decision.m It remains to be seen
365. See Roberts, supra note 170, at 93.
366. Referring to labor and antitrust law, the Court in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3,
325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945), observed that the "result of all this is that we have two congres-
sional policies which it is our responsibility to try to reconcile.... We must determine
here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize the
results envisioned by the other." Commenting on Allen Bradley, one writer noted that
the Court was left to its own devices because "Congress had failed to indicate how the
prohibition of commercial restraints and the purposes underlying that prohibition were to
be integrated with the purpose of fostering unionization and collective bargaining."
Meltzer, supra note 1, at 675; see also Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954,
959 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The interaction of the Sherman Act and the federal labor legislation
is an area marked more by controversy than by clarity."); Leslie, supra note 1, at 1184
("The legislature has chosen to follow both [antitrust and labor] policies, and the courts
must determine the proper scope of each.").
367. One commentator, writing immediately after the Pennington and Jewel Tea deci-
sions in 1965, opined that there would be "a substantial consensus that Congress should
attempt to draw clearer lines and that its continued abdication will confront the Court
with intractable problems." Meltzer, supra note 1, at 734.
368. The view that the Court took is not a new one. Justice Brandeis, writing in dis-
sent in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921), suggested that labor
and management should perhaps be left alone to settle their disputes. See id. at 486
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Congress, he said, had "declared that the relations between
employers of labor and workingmen were competitive relations, that organized competi-
tion was not harmful, and that it justified injuries inflicted in its course." Al. (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). He offered the following quote from a committee report for comparison:
There are apparently, only two lines of action possible: First to restrict the
rights and powers of employers to correspond in substance to the powers and
rights now allowed to trade unions, and second, to remove all restrictions which
now prevent the freedom of action of both parties to industrial disputes, retain-
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whether the collective bargaining system will be able to withstand the
effects of this decision, or whether such an oppressive regime will de-
velop that "antitrust courts" will yet again have to return to the game
and apply antitrust law in the labor arena.
JONATHAN P. HEYL
ing only the ordinary civil and criminal restraints for the preservation of life,
property and the public peace. The first method has been tried and failed abso-
lutely... The only method therefore seems to be the removal of all restrictions
upon both parties, thus legalizing the strike, the lockout, the boycott, the black-
list, the bringing in of strike-breakers, and peaceful picketing.
Id. at 486-87 n.2 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
1997] 1083
